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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if political
risk insurance will provide incentive enough to stem
capital flight from developing nations in Latin America.
The study is based on a review of the literature on capital
flight and country risk assessment and on interviews with:
Latin American
abroad, in an e
perpetrators of
investor
ffort to
capital
s holding portions
study the rationale
f light;
of their assets
followed by the
Officers of U.S. banks holding Latin American debt, to
asses their support to a project of this sort;
Private and government-controlled insurance companies
providing forms of political risk coverage in the region,
to understand actuarial country risk assessment;
Officers
to LDCs,
at multilateral organizations providing financing
to understand their developmental policies;
U.S. Government officials at the Departments of Commerce,
State and Treasury, to comprehend the policies implemented
to deal with the problem of capital flight.
The study concludes that political risk insurance is not
incentive enough to reverse capital flight. Structural,
economic and political causes influence investor's
decisions to continue seeking the security of foreign
diversification.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Donald R. Lessard
Title: Professor of International Management
Introduction
The absence of growth in the economies of Latin
American nations is due in great part to the lack of
capital investment. Capital flees the region when faced
with the prospect of confronting risks such as chronic
currency devaluations, nationalizations, exchange controls,
and general political or economic instability.
If such risks could be insured by a carrier with
long-term commitments and adequate financial backing, Latin
savings abroad could be lured back to the region. The
consequences of drawing massive sustained investment into
Latin America would bring about increased per capita
income, growth of GNP, increased exports and foreign
currency reserves, eventually allowing for stable
economies, providing the basis for widespread prosperity in
the region.
providing
insurance
The purpose of this thesis
protection in the form
to local investors of deve
is to determine if
of political risk
loping nations would
9create the adequate incentives to stem or reverse capital
flight. Given the importance of the region as a trading
partner of the United States, special emphasis will be
given in the analysis to Latin American less developed
countries (LDCs).
The first chapter studies the causes, magnitude
and consequences of capital flight. The second attempts to
establish the feasibility of providing political risk
protection, what type of entity could do it, and what
premiums are needed to cover country risks. The third
chapter studies the Latin American investors' rationale and
decision process when effecting capital investment
diversification abroad, and his demand for political risk
insurance. The last chapter provides some conclusions.
The main sources of information for this research
project were personal interviews. These included Latin
American investors, and in the United States, private
banking and insurance executives, officers of the
government and international and multilateral organizations
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dealing with Latin America.' These sources were
supplemented with literature on the subject of capital
flight, country risk assessment and economic development of
the LDCs.
* For a detailed list of sources please refer to the
appendix. Latin American investor's names were kept
confidential as per our agreement. I have identified only
their country of origin.
Commerce and manufacturers can seldom
flourish in any state in which there is not a
certain degree of confidence in the justice of
government.
Adam Smith (1776)
Chapter I
Capital Flight
Definition of Terms
Discussing the issue
strong emotions. With headings
Man's Loot" 2 news media editoria
facts, making it probably one
Americans are most misunderstood
of capital flight arouses
like "Poor Man's Debt, Rich
ls subjectively confuse the
of the areas where Latin
Some view it as a symptom of a sick society,
as a cause of Latin America's failure to recover
from the debt problem and a rational reason for
lenders to be leery of increasing their exposure.
Others regard the term as a pejorative description
of natural, economically rational responses to
portfolio choices that have confronted wealthy
2 The Washington Post, Jan '89 article by James S Henry
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residents of some debtor countries in some recent
years. Both views are correct.
When law-abiding citizens fleeing exposure to
political risks queue up at financial institutions abroad,
they join tax evaders skimming unreported profits, drug
dealers transporting their collections, and politicians
hiding their loot. It is such company that gives flight
capital such a bad rap.
When Latins think of capital flight, they
perceive themselves as people suffering high risk
exposures, simply reacting as rational citizens to protect
their rightfully-owned assets from undue risks. It must be
noted that country risk affects locals more than foreign
investors. Locals are overexposed because naturally, they
tend to have substantially higher proportions of their own
assets invested in their home countries. Their desire to
protect their economic status through international
diversification is in direct conflict with national
3 Lessard, D., Williamsen, J.(1987): Capital Flight: The
Problem and Policy Responses, Institute for International
Economics, Washington, D.C.
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loyalties. Yet, in looking for this diversification, these
investors are acting rationally and "normally" as their
counterparts would in developed nations.
In order to understand capital outflows, the
terms have to be defined. The same action say, by an
investor in Japan that purchases a property in Hawaii or
opens a saving account in California, is considered a
normal diversification effort. But, when a Latin investor
does the same in Florida it counts as flight capital. What
is the difference? Lessard and Williamsen (1987) justify
the different classification arguing that the underlying
rationale in both cases is the same but the motivation is
not. In the second case; moneys are running away from a
country for variety of fears and suspicions, and not
necessarily acting on purely economical reasoning or
motivation.
Latin American movements of capital are defined
as capital flight because local investors are trying to
escape the high risk exposure in their home countries. In
our example, the Japanese investor would be merely
14
responding to opportunities abroad and fulfilling personal
goals of risk diversification in his investment portfolio.
In support of this fact, note that most Latin
investor's foreign holdings are in passive investments
yielding lower real rates of return than the ones obtained
in the normal course of their businesses in their own
countries. The fact these returns are in a hard currency
with lower risks of devaluation justifies it.
Capital
negative, nor is
most countries.
capital outflows
Yet, I would st
flight," together
the intended pol
the legality of
the agreement wi
outflows are not always considered
it necessarily illegal to perform them in
As late as 1981, Venezuela encouraged
on the grounds it reduced inflation.
ill classify these outflows as "capital
with moneys transferred illegally against
icy of the host government. The issue of
the currency conversion and transfer, or
th the policies of the host government,
4 Williamson, John and Lessard, Donald R. (1987): Capital
Flight: Policy and Responses, Institute for International
Economics, Washington, DC
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have nothing to do with the fact those moneys are converted
and held abroad because the investors consider themselves
at risk in their own country. History has taught them not
to trust the stability of their country's fiscal and
monetary policies. In the case of Venezuela, the ones who
exchanged Bolivars for U.S. Dollars were only very timely
in getting rid of a fictitiously overvalued currency.
There is a value judgement implied in the common definition
of capital flight, as it suggests "capital flight" differs
from "undesirable capital outflows." In fact, Capital
Flight: Policy and Responses states there is such thing as
"good" capital flight, citing as an example the flows
involving the German Jews in the 1930s.
This leaves the connotation that persecuted
German Jews were "justified" in taking their moneys out of
Germany because of logically perceived high risks to their
persons and their assets. Implicitly, we come to accept the
existence of a difference with those flows coming out of
Latin America, where individuals feel their governments's
actions are confiscatory in nature, threatening their well
being. I will discuss at length this issue when describing
16
the nature of the risks capital gets exposed to in the
LDCs.
Thus for this work, the term capital flight will
encompass only the abnormal movements of domestic capital
caused as a reaction to specific regional threats and that
go beyond normal portfolio diversification. The question
of the legality of the flows, or if they are or not
desirable for the domestic economy, will play no role in
the definition of this concept.
Magnitude of the Problem
In the early 80s the world was running an annual
balance of payments deficit with itself on the vicinity of
$100 billion. In other words, the balance of payments
deficit equaled 10% of the total value of world market
trade. The International Monetary Fund had a useless
explanation for such a statistical hole; it explained it
was "caused by "asymmetries." The fact is this figure
comprised the tip of the iceberg for growing hidden capital
flows from a world underground economy. Capital flight per
se, is an important part of these flows.
Measuring capital flight with any degree of
accuracy is a problem. One of the most often used and
accepted procedure is that of equating it with the "errors
and omissions" figure in the Balance of Payments accounts.
But this procedure is plagued with flaws in both the
assumptions used (specifically regarding by which means
5 Naylor R.T. (1987) Hot Money and the Politics of Debt
The Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, New York, N.Y.
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capital outflows take place), and the serious difficulty in
obtaining reliable information. Lets look at the schematic
balance of payments accounts in Table 1 and go through its
application to understand the argument I am trying to make.
Table 1
Balance of Payments Accounts
Exports of Goods and Non Factor
Imports of Goods and Non Factor.
Investment Income
Foreign Debt Service Payments
Remittances from Abroad
Transfers and Outflows
Services
Services
+ (A)
-(B)
+(C)
-(D)
+(E)
-(F)
(G)
+ (H)
+(I)
-(J)
-(K)
- (L)
-(M)
(N)
+(0)
(P)
Source: modified by the author from Capital Flight: Policy
and Responses
Total Current Account Balance
Direct Investment from Abroad
New Foreign Loans
Amortization of Foreign Debt
Increase in Foreign Assets of Domestic
Banking System
Resident Capital Outflow into Long-Term
Assets
Resident Capital Outflow into Short-Term
Assets
Total Capital Account Balance
Errors and Omissions
Increase in Foreign Currency Reserves
To begin with, most analysts have
Resident Capital Outflows converted to long
represent "normal" portfolio diversification,
20
assumed (L),
term assets,
whereas (M),
Resident Capital Outflows converted to short
are more likely to
distinction can be m
of capital flight
market accounts, ti
matures and becomes
will convert some of
ones. The point is
represent flight
isleading. It is t
is usually short
me deposits)'. As
a sophisticated f
those same assets
that the change in
to do with the underlying rationale
of capital. This
rue, the first step
term assets (money
the account holder
oreign investor, it
into long term fixed
no way has anything
ompting the investor
to keep those
meriting class
assets outside of
ification under a
his own country,
separate category.
thus, not
Both
investor
thing it
authoriti
(L) and (M) are very di
is fleeing from abnormal
wants to do is attract
es. Thus, it is highly
fficult to measure.
risks at home, the
the attention of the
unlikely any reports
* Without exception, Latin American investors interviewed
indicated that the opening of foreign currency checking
accounts and short term certificates of deposit was their
first step to secure capital outflows.
term assets,
If an
last
local
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will get filed with the government. In many instances,
even if it is totally legal and foreign currency is readily
available at the local bank, outflows are hidden from local
authorities and government statisticians. This is achieved
in many ways, particularly depositing the moneys under
shell corporations domiciled in so called "tax haven"
countries. Most of the flows are impossible to trace,
occurring hidden as part of under-invoiced (A) Exports of
Goods; over invoiced (B) Imports of Goods; or "black
market" purchases of foreign currency originating from (E)
Remittances from Abroad.
Underground transactions, though usually more
expensive to the investor, occur mainly in countries that
impose strict exchange controls, or in those that introduce
distorting externalities, (such as subsidized exchange
rates for certain imports.) Local businessmen feel it is
their right to take full advantage of these distorting
factors, and most tend to abuse them. Let me share an
example of how one of these processes worked in a case I'm
familiar with:
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In 1986 Eximbank' extended a line of credit to
the Central Bank of Guatemala for the exclusive purpose of
financing the purchase of raw materials from the United
States. The credit line was made available to Guatemalan
manufacturers at an arbitrary preferential exchange rate of
1.6 Quetzales per dollar. At the time, the prevailing
exchange rate in the open market was 3.2 Quetzales per
dollar.
Importers scrambled to meet the many bureaucratic
requirements for these loans, as they represented a 50%
savings to purchase U.S dollars. (The government of
Guatemala required the savings be transferred to the
public, thus easing the inflationary pressure of the
recently devalued Quetzal.) All seems ok up to here. The
problem is that the importer has no problem in getting his
supplier or freight forwarder to over-invoice the goods and
beat the system for a substantial profit.
Eximbank is an independent U.S. Government agency that
helps to finance and facilitate the export of American Goods
and services.
So, for example, raw materials
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worth one million
dollars will
of credit
After shippi
to deposit
account (in
double windf
currency to
market and
Quetzales as
cost. By
be invoiced
guar
ng,
the
the
all
imp
gai
a
for $1.5 million
anteed and e
the exporter
over-invoice
name of th
for the im
ort his good
ns fictitic
tax deductibl
ventually
collects h
d $500,000
e importer)
porter. I
s at 50% 1
usly eight
e incremen
this process capital
pai
is
in
t
owe
h
t i
outflows
through a letter
d by Eximbank.
due and proceeds
a local U.S.
Note here the
obtains foreign
r cost than the
undred thousand
n raw materials
become a tax
deductible expense keeping the books
beyond suspicion! These types of
great temptation, are too easy to
serve as an incentive for capital
damaging form.
properly b
distortion
hide, and
flight of
alanced and
s create a
in reality
the most
So if the deposit is made into a U.S. bank
account in the name of a shell corporation domiciled in any
accommodating "tax-haven" country, the Balance of Payments
accounts would have never been able to pick the transaction
up on its (0) Errors and Omissions account. Although both
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tend to cancel each other, the same would happen with
under-invoiced exports and "black market" purchases of
remittances.
I have used quotation marks when referring to the
black market of currency because its existence is not
necessarily illegal, as the name implies. For example, in
Guatemala the tax code allows businesses to deduct as a
legal expense the cost of purchasing currency in the open
or black market, even when banking laws state that only the
Central Bank has the authority to buy and sell foreign
currency in the country. Inconsistencies in the law remain
in a somewhat intentional manner, as the condition allows
the government to apply the law of their choice when they
need to.
Freeing the currency market relieves the pressure
from the Central Bank which cannot provide dollars at the
"official" rate to satisfy the needs of importers. The
system allows the Central Bank to operate with two or three
rates of exchange that match the intended economic policies
of the government, without needing officially to devaluate
the currency. Notice that without officia
government owned companies holding U.S. dol
liabilities, maintain fictitiously low debt
They conveniently convert debt in their
official rate.
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devaluation,
ar denominated
equity ratios.
books at the
Presuming (0) Errors and Omissions are in fact
caused by capital outflows, it would be appropriate to
include them as a part of (M) Short Term Capital Outflows.
Though this approach falls short because of the arguments
expressed above, it has been used in the pioneering studies
in this area."
The Institute for International Economics'
conference on capital flight concluded that none of the
existing measures of resident capital outflows was
satisfactory. Even if its measurement accuracy cannot be
ascertained, the relevant point for this thesis is that the
estimated resident capital stock held abroad by Latin
Americans is of a magnitude similar to all the region's
* Lessard, et al (1987)
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foreign debt. Any project achieving the return of these
funds would have a tremendous relevance to the economies of
the region.
Table 2
Deposits of
in Billions
year
Argentina
81
82
83
84
85**
Brazil
81
82
83
84
85**
Mexico
81
82
83
84
85**
Non Banks Held Domestically and Abroad,
of U.S. Dollars, at year end.
In Domestic
Banking System*
24.3
8.2
In Banks
Abroad
6.7
7.1
7.9
7.6
8.2
47.
49.
35.
38.
38.
70.5
32.2
36.8
45.4
35.8
Deposits Abroad%
Domestic Deposits
28
87
94
99
115
8
8
23
21
22
13
32
34
31
43
9.
10.
12.
14.
15.
Source: World Financial Markets (April/May
* Deposits (Sight,
converted at end
Savings and Time) in local currency
of period exchange rates.
** September figures.
1986)
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Table 2 details the
and corporations (non-banks),
for Brazil, Argentina and
1985. Note from these fi
estimated deposits abroad.
domestic deposits, reached 1
of 1985.
balances held by individuals
both domestically and abroad
Mexico for the years 1981 to
gures the magnitude of the
When expressed as a ratio of
15% for Argentina in September
The fact citizens of developing nations are
willing to keep a larger share of their savings stock
abroad rather than at home, and the relative importance
such funds have for the local economies, should be reason
enough to make every effort to identify the causes for this
phenomena. Understanding the causes, a critical first step
in identifying possible solutions is the central motivation
for this thesis.
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Causes For Capital Flight
The fact that discernible peaks of capital
outflows occurring in major Latin American countries have
not coincided, leads one to believe that the major causes
for capital flight lie in a country's particular
circumstances. As opposed to external factors such as high
interest rates or lack of interest income taxation in the
United States. These source country causes, when analyzed,
can be grouped as structural, political and economical.
Lets look at each in detail, particularly as perceived by
the Latin investors themselves and by the banking
community.
Structural Causes
the cond
flight.
capital
between
It is sometimes very difficult to determine if
itions cited are causes or consequences of capital
For example, analyzing an obvious motivator of
outflows, such as interest rate differentials
the domestic system and any foreign bank, poses the
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problem of establishing what comes first. Real rates are
influenced by currency devaluations, and exchange rates in
turn are affected by capital outflows. An obvious circular
form of reasoning takes place, forcing us to face a typical
"chicken and egg" problem.
Albeit, in reality it is possible to identify the
structural and economic roots of the problem in the
government's intervention. Notwithstanding this fact, an
argument will always be made that the flight of investment
capital is also a cause of the structural deficiencies and
economic upturns in the LDCs.
Capital flight does not occur only as a reaction
to political risks. On many instances, the investor will
choose to place his assets abroad because it perceives that
investment opportunities in his country are deficient,
either because the country remains underdeveloped in
commercial and banking laws or lacks a functioning capital
market. Infrastructures incapable of handling large scale
operations and the small capacity of absorption of the
market are often included among the reasons investors seek
to diversify their investments abroad.
These deficiencies are termed structural because
the local economies will only attract a certain amount of
local or foreign investment due to the institutional
structures of the government, its legal systems
commercial codes. Following is an analysis of each:
Financial Markets
Financial markets in Latin America are
doing their key developmental role of elici
higher savings efficiently. And they are
geared up to attract significant reflow
residents' assets now held abroad.
not
ting
not
of
The problem lies in government policies.
Until public sectors in Latin America are cut back
in both scope and borrowing requirements,
available savings will continue to finance
inefficient bureaucracies and money-loosing state
companies instead of capital formation with a high
rate of return . . . .. Government financing
practices must evolve away from compulsory, non-
market mechanisms toward voluntary, market-
determined vehicles that price capital
appropriately for both public- and private-sector
users. Warranted also are the dismantling of
credit allocation rules and the phasing out of
interest-rate subsidies, which ration capital
resources to established, often inefficient
companies at the expense of emerging industries.
and
31
State-owned financial institutions should not
enjoy preferential treatment and should base their
lending on sound economic and financial
considerations. Finally, the structure of
interest rates in most countries should be freed
to encourage greater financial savings -- at home
rather than abroad.'
The reform of financial markets cannot be carried
out in isolation from supporting macroeconomic policies.
This is the lesson of successful reforms elsewhere. Among
other reforms to improve growth prospects, debtor countries
must raise investment and increase productivity, eliminate
subsidies and protection of money-loosing government owned
enterprises. This, in turn, requires expansion of domestic
savings, the reversal of capital flight and efficient
allocation of resources. If financial market reforms and
structural changes, as the ones discussed here, are carried
out to remedy existing deficiencies, then the inflows of
foreign capital can make and enduring and positive
contribution to Latin American economic growth. L a t i n
investors faced with developmental problems in their home
countries and with the option to participate in fully
* World Financial Markets April/May 1986, page 10
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developed international capital markets confront the tough
choice: national loyalty versus rational self interest.
Capital Markets
Except for the larger Latin American nations,
most LDCs do not even have an organized market where stocks
or commercial paper can be traded. The lack of developed
capital markets does not allow for the masses or
institutions to invest in assets that could show capital
appreciation. This factor, coupled with the shortage of
available long-term credit, limits most enterprises to be
individual investments or limited partnerships. Though
statistics might show a high proportion of public
corporations registered to operate in the LDCs, in effect
they are very closely-held family corporations. Few have
their stock publicly traded.
Legal Systems
The poor design or inconsistent application of
the law is also considered one of the structural causes for
lack of
example,
suppl ier
and hav
col lect
creates
credit a
in the U
r
n
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additional capital investment in the region. For
few LDCs have commercial codes that permit a
to force a creditor into bankruptcy proceedings,
the courts liquidate its assets in order to
L chronic past due account. Poor legal support
substantial abuse that discourages commercial
d the normal operation of businesses as conceived
ited States.
On the other hand, the civil
generally slow, cumbersome and easily
condition is very threatening to inves
knowing what protection or threat to
courts.
court system is
corrupted. This
tors who fear not
expect from the
Infrastructure
Last, but also a critical factor, is the
pervasive lack of adequate infrastructure caused by
incompetent government operated public services and
utilities. Poorly planned and outdated phone systems and
postal services, highway and port installations, etcetera,
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are all reasons why many industries choose not to establish
in the region. This is an obstacle for investment, as the
inefficiencies it creates are enough to offset comparative
advantages such as low labor costs, availability of raw
materials or geographic location. These limitations,
coupled with the issues of political risk, are enough
incentive to drive away the capital from the most loyal and
nationalist citizens.
Political Causes for Capital Flight
The well publicized, often caricatured images of
Latin American military rulers that get continually
toppled, replaced by other military "juntas" or dictators,
causes a level of unrest that constitutes the top of the
iceberg regarding the types of politically caused risks to
which investors are exposed in the LDC. Beyond commercial
risks caused by political unrest lie a series of capricious
government actions that can be destructive for business.
To bring this point across, let me share the
experiences of extreme cases as related during two
interviews with Nicaraguan and Peruvian entrepreneurs, both
living today in Miami, Florida. The Nicaraguan investor
assured he was not exaggerating when he stated that his
businesses had suffered every one of the instances
described below.
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Confiscation
The outright takeover of the company, with no
compensation being paid to the owners constitutes a
confiscation. This condition will happen only in a state
of anarchy, where the government wants to "punish" a
scapegoat for the economic problems affecting the poor, or
a large mass of voters.
Invasion
The takeover of company facilities by mobs, on
occasions led by and condoned by government officials,
constitutes the most typical type of invasion of property.
The civil police forces look the other way and the court
system offers no help or has no authority to enforce any
actions by the owners.
Nationalization or Expropriation
One of
an expropriation
the most extreme forms of political risks;
is carried out by the government through
37
its court systems, for the well being of the community, or
to serve national interests. Owners expect to be
reimbursed for the fair market value of their property.
However, in Nicaragua, nationalizations took
place perceived as revenges, punishing political loyalties
of the stockholders. The values of the properties were
understated by government appraisers, and to aggravate
matters, payment was made in the form of government bonds
payable in local currency several years into the future.
In a real example, a property appraised for U.S.
$ 3.0 million was nationalized in 1979 by the government
and paid for with bonds for 30.0 million Cordobas due in 10
years, bearing a 12% interest per annum paid at maturity.
(The prevailing rate of exchange in 1978 was +/-- 10
Cordobas per Dollar.) This year the owner will collect his
93.2 million Cordobas which convert to U.S.$ 1,553.33.
This is not a typing mistake. After repeated devaluations,
today the exchange rate is +/- 60,000 Cordobas per Dollar!
38
These bonds could have been sold at varying
levels of discount in the years before maturity, and their
market value would have been higher. Yet, the point
remains, the loss of one person would have been split into
the loss of several. The numbers still hold to make the
point of the magnitude of the risks to which investors are
exposed in the region. This case is reminiscent of the way
the German government deflated its restitutions debt after
the war. In effect it is one way of legalized robbery,
from which locals are justified in seeking protection.
According to Victor Meneses, senior corporate
officer for Latin America and Africa at Citicorp,
nationalization fears have greatly receded, as there has
not been a pattern of them during the last eight years or
so. Nonetheless, the past nationalizations of banks in El
Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua have sent tremors throughout
the region. As of today, these fears are probably more
localized in Central America, due to the threat posed by
the communist government in Nicaragua, than in any other
South American country. Table 3 shows a comparison of the
frequency of expropriations by region, in the world between
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1960 and 1976. One can see that Latin America leads
developing regions in total number of expropriations; even
though they have affected, as compared with the rest of the
world, a low percentage of U.S. owned corporations
operating in the region. These data say a lot about the
political clout of the U.S. government with Latin nations
and justifies the perceived level of risk to which domestic
investors feel they are exposed to.
Table 3
Expropriations by Region, 1960 -1976
Total Number of As % of U.S companies
Expropriations in the Region
Latin America 144 2.6
Arab States 78 20.4
Black Africa 39 8.1
Asia 31 2.2
Source: Shapiro, Allan C. (1982),
Multinational Financial Management,
Allyn & Bacon Inc., Boston
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Intervention
Intervention by the government can take many
forms; from subtle controls exercised by government
organized unions, to the outright appointment of government
officials to administrative or board of directors'
positions. This type of actions inhibit the normal
operation of business to such a degree, they may eventually
destroy it.
Special Taxes
Special taxes are taxes levied on a particular
industry, as opposed to applying equally to all
enterprises. In Nicaragua, the investor held these actions
were taken with the intention of causing harm to a
particular business in order to control it eventually.
Removal of Protection
countries
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only
companies
because
are able to exist in
special barriers for
developing
entry were
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imposed on foreign competitors, they had been exempt of
certain taxes or granted access to subsidized financing.
These special treatments are offered industry wide, and for
a predetermined numbers of years. A surprise lifting of
this protection before the originally offered time period
expires, practically eliminates the companies' ability to
operate.
Price Controls
A venture can easily be destroyed if it is forced
to sell some of its products at a given price level,
regardless of its costs. The obvious option, simply to
stop selling price-controlled, money-loosing items is not
necessarily feasible. A company manufacturing
pharmaceutical products will expose itself to immediate
nationalization if it refuses to sell inventories of
products the government considers "basic necessities" for
the masses. Laws against "hoarding and speculation"
capriciously created and liberally applied, bring court
orders to sell inventories, fines to the firm and jail
terms for its managers. The true goal is to distract
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attention and to shift the blame to the private
for ill designed public policies.
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prices that were higher than world market ones. The price
of the finished product was set at a level that was well
below its costs using domestic raw materials. Facing huge
losses, the producer requested to permission to import its
raw materials at the lower world prices. Even after
offering to use its own sources to secure the foreign
currency needed, the request was denied. Facing bankruptcy,
the government eventually revised the price structure,
allowing the company to continue to operate. Resilient
management and entrepreneurial ownership are tested to
their limits in these instances.
Employment and Wage Controls
A company can be forced to pay fictitiously high
minimum wages, or to maintain a larger work force than
needed. Sometimes unions are granted the authority to
decide who is hired or who can be fired, and when.
Surprising as it may sound, companies can also be prevented
from paying higher wages when needed, thus promoting the
desertion of qualified personnel. This last case
particularly applies to managerial positions, justified by
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the myopic view that management serves no "productive"
function. Managers' high salaries are perceived as taking
away income from those in the general labor force.
Calling In of Loans
Corporations suffer chaos when the government
takes control of the banking system and proceeds to call in
existing loans, or with the same effect, refuses to provide
additional lending. Often this step is done to permit the
government's "legal" intervention of a business in a way
that is sure not to create the international repercussions
nationalizations do.
Intimidation
Officers or executives of a company can be
intimidated by government officials or by a government
organized union. Damage is caused by promoting the
desertion of qualified personnel and by disrupting the
normal operations of the company when threatened executives
feel forced to leave the country.
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One of the most damaging types of intimidation
occurs in the form of kidnapping. This is a risk that has
been dealt with very efficiently in developed countries due
to the integrity and efficiency of the security forces.
But in many countries of Latin America, kidnapping of
executives and family members of stockholders occur
constantly and without apparent control of the authorities.
Businesses are forced to invest substantial
amounts of capital protecting both executives and
facilities. These expenditures are totally unproductive
and contribute to decrease the level of productivity of the
firm.
Devaluation
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convertible. Intentionally, currency devaluation is being
listed among other political risks. This is based on the
conviction devaluations are mainly the direct result of
incompetent government actions and not purely of exogenous
economic conditions.
Exchange Controls
The government through currency exchange controls
can inhibit the payment of foreign private debts, making
the local operator loose its international credit ratings.
This happens when an importer is required to deposit, in
local currency with the central bank, all remittances owed
to foreign suppliers. The Central Bank in turn will emit,
against its deposit accounts abroad, a cashier's check in
the name of the supplier which the company forwards. The
problem originates when hard currencies are scarce. A
backlog "dam" builds up at the central bank, manifesting
itself first in the form of processing delays of 3 to six
months. Eventually the Central Bank is confronted with the
option of "paying" with debentures, in lieu of cash.
This action brings
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Physical Destruction
In this point I want to identify the risk of the
destruction of property caused by non insurable events,
such as revolutions, civil turmoil, malicious acts and
terrorism. Applying the war exemption clause of insurance
policies, some times riots and mob actions are refused
coverage by normal hazard insurance policies, as these
events are linked to larger national disturbances.
To deal with such elements of political risk, as
mentioned above, huge amounts of top management's time and
corporate resources are needed. This waste is one fact
often ignored, that contributes to make LDC enterprises
uncompetitive with the rest of the world.
49
Economic Causes for Capital Flight
One of the major causes of capital flight has
been the erratic returns obtained from the financial
markets in most of the LDCs. In Argentina, Mexico and
Brazil, the masses that participated in the banking
financial markets with their savings deposits, have lost
fortunes through devaluations and inflation. Adjusted for
inflation, depositors have received, in effect, negative
rates of return. The ones that waited, in a few years
basically lost their assets.
Figure 1 presents graphically the real rates of
return obtained by saving accounts deposit holders in those
three countries between 1981 and 1986. In the graph,
nominal saving rates of return were deflated by the
consumers' price inflation index of each country. Notice
that using this method of computation, during this period
Mexico did not ever yield a positive rate of return on a
savings account. Argentina's CD rate, on the other hand,
erratically ranged its yields from -60 percent in one
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quarter, to as high as +108 percent in another. Brazil has
allowed the market (or has succeeded in following it), to
set the pricing of savings return rates, with the result of
achieving, in this aspect at least, more stability.
These rates of return correlate well with the
patterns of capital flight in each of these countries.
From these data alone, it is not surprising that Brazil has
had the least problem of capital outflows of the three
major Latin American LDCs. An investor, in any of these
countries, would be almost irrational not to protect its
hard earned savings by removing them from the system
entirely. Or at least, exchange them in to hard
convertible assets that might prove to be more inflation
proof.
Real Interest Rates for Saving Accounts
Three Major Latin American Countries
1981 - 1985
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Figure 1
** Argentine 30 day CD rate regulated until March '85,
free rate thereafter.
Source: World Financial Markets (April/May 1986)
published by Morgan Guarantee Trust Co., New York
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Figure 2
Source: World Financial Markets, April/May 1986
Figure 2 presents a graphic comparison of the
trends in domestic savings formation in the same three
Cummulative Dollar Value
of Domestic Saving Deposits
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major Latin countries, and compares it with that of the
United States. The effect of the erratic returns in the
market, in the rate of savings formation and accumulation,
is obvious.
This point is even better made when we compare
the rate of return differential between a U.S. dollar
denominated deposit with one of equivalent amount in a LDC.
The differential is calculated by depositing an amount in
the United States in a regular savings account, and the
equivalent exchange in a LDC. Ninety days later, the
returns of each, capital plus interest, are converted back
to U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the day. The
percentage difference between the two amounts is plotted in
Figure 3 for Argentina, and Figure 4 for Mexico.
An investor would have made on average 39% less
per year in Argentina, and 5.3% less per year in Mexico, if
compared the returns of a low-yielding savings account in
the U.S. From the data analyzed before, one can see
investors had very good reasons to take their moneys out of
Latin America. And that is what they did, as suggested by
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Figures 3 and 4 that also depict capital outflows in those
countries during the same period. From these
possible to see the direct correlation the
capital have with the returns on deposits.
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Source: World Financial Markets, April/May 1986
Kyung-Mo Hu, senior economist at the Exchange and
Trade Relations Department of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), expressed that the creation of a futures market
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for currency exchange would help create the right
environment for the repatriation of flight capital. A
futures market would enable local investors to protect
themselves from the risks discussed in this section.
Hedging currency devaluations is impossible with monetary
instruments in most Latin American countries. This
deficiency should be included among the structural
deficiencies of most developing economies. In fact, the
IMF links capital flight directly with restrictions to the
conversion of currency and the inability to protect oneself
from devaluation.
Note that averages of return differentials can be
very misleading. A difference of 5% over several years
might not seem as too big, but one single quarter with 50
or 60 percent differential is certainly an overwhelming
motivator to take one's money out the local currency, and
even better, deposit it out of the country. To bring those
deposits back, the incentive must be even greater because
of the investor's perception that the same risk may occur
again at any unpredicted moment.
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Also, it is important to remember, that
devaluations in Latin America are usually measured in terms
of the U.S. dollar. If the investor reasonably computes
returns in terms of the Deutsche Mark or the Yen, in
certain periods it could increase the differential
substantially. In risk adjusted terms, the return
differential between a deposit in any LDC and a
conservative investment in a developed country, makes
capital flight an economic imperative for the rational
investor.
A few export industries with substantial local
value added activities manage to maintain themselves ahead
of inflation always under grave danger of loosing terrain.
Even these companies, investing their local currencies in
fixed capital assets are not protected from the side
effects of inflation. The premise that an asset is simply
worth more units of local currency after devaluations, is
not necessarily true. Fixed assets do not provide
protection enough because of huge time lags in the
adjustment of prices. These lags are mainly caused by the
companies' inability to obtain financing in the market. As
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deposits flee into hard currencies, the banks are left with
no funds to support their lending activities. (Refer again
to Figure 2 in page 42, for the cumulative dollar value of
domestic deposits in three major Latin American LDCs.)
This factor, coupled with the lack of demand for capital
goods in a recession, depresses market prices to levels
well below their replacement values.
Most companies find it impossible to carry the
burden of interest rates that attempt to predict future
inflation rates and protect the bank from this risk. Thus
are unable to finance inventories, plant and equipment,
eventually going bankrupt. This point is difficult to
imagine for someone that has not operated a business in a
country exposed to such hyperinflation. The experiences of
Peruvian investors interviewed brings this point forward
dramatically.
In the recent past, the official'' interest-rate
in Peru was of 120% per annum. But to protect itself from
1A In Peru, just as in many LDC economies interest rates are
imposed and regulated by the government.
unpredictable and escalating devaluations, the nominal
charged by the banks ended up being equal to 520% per
annum.
govern
higher
to ta
cost
given
deposi
import
To go around
ment, the borrowe
amount than the
ke its interest c
of financing impo
the government's
t 50% of the valu
licence is reque
the ra
r is
one re
harge
rted i
requ
e of
sted.
te contr
asked to
ceived, a
up front
nventorie
irement
its impo
T
months and thus with great delay
he app
one
ols imposed by the
sign a note for a
nd the bank proceeds
. Just imagine the
s of raw materials,
that the importer
rts at the time the
roval normally took
could expect to give
start to the long process of the importation.
Local investors in LDCs don't yet feel
comfortable enough in terms of the macroeconomic swings in
the region. In the United States, as in all industrialized
nations, investors have sought to limit their risks and
exposure in a particular industry through different forms
of diversification. One of these processes, the precursor
of the multinational corporation in a stable environment,
is known as conglomeration. Through conglomeration a
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corporation diversifies into unrelated fields within its
own territory . . .
as businesses in individual markets become
riskier. Investors naturally [seek] to limit the
losses they would suffer in any one line of
business by diversifying their interests. The
management of assets at risk is one of the things
to which Neo-classical Economics is well suited;
this school of economics convincingly argues that
in certain circumstances, diversification [meaning
across industries in one market] would contribute
to economic efficiency and growth.12
In a country where investors fear economic
instability will eventually endanger all areas of the
economy, the option of conglomeration is not a solution.
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So capital flight takes place as a response to economic
instability and the difficulty to diversify risks
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The ever visible hand of Government intervention
in the market pricing of factors of production causes
additional incentives for capital outflows. For example,
the Guatemalan government that has historically controlled
the interest rate structure banks may
loan rates to a maximum of 11% per annum.
long term, high grade commercial paper in
yielding returns of up to 20%, and
certificates of deposit 17%. An investor
this arbitrage by borrowing to his capacity
converting the proceeds of his loan in local
dollars and finally depositing it abroad.
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Such distortions in the market precipitated the
devaluation of the Guatemalan Quetzal, as it was impossible
to hold the official rate of exchange against such
pressure. This phenomenon created unusual demands on the
banking system, pushing all institutions to their legal
lending limits and, obviously, drying up available
resources critically needed to finance working capital of
local enterprises. In a financial system free to react to
charge, in 1978
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fixed
market forces, such demand would have caused
increases. Thus, eliminating the arbitrage
and with it the element of fictitious demand.
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interest rate
opportunities
With this we complete the section that attempts
to narrow down the causes of capital flight, and turn to an
analysis of its consequences and implications for different
stakeholders. The purpose is to identify who benefits from
reversing capital outflows, and eventually who would be
willing to support an insurance scheme to achieve it.
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Consequences and Implications of Capital Flight
For Less Developed Countries
The first and immediate consequence of capital
flight is the deterioration of the balance payments
accounts of the nation. Foreign exchange reserves are
reduced to levels that are insufficient in most cases to
absorb more than a limited proportion of the initial impact
of any crisis. In most LDCs, reserves have been reduced
below levels that would provide even the barest minimum of
operational flexibility for short-term economic management.
This has forced most developing nations to carry out
austerity programs, reducing imports of all kinds.
Countries differ considerably in the extent to
which they can compress imports without suffering adverse
effects. "Much depends on the degree and promptness with
which a country can shift resources from domestic
consumption to exports and provide domestic substitutes for
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imports. This type of flexibility is in turn a function
of the stage and development of the industrial sector."1 4
The lack of capital investment in developing
nations of Latin America is one of the fundamental causes
for the backward conditions of the region. In this point
there is agreement even among the extremes of different
political system ideologies. El yanov, a communist
economist states in this regard:
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rapidly expanding population is acute in these
countries as never before.1
Without capital investment there is
competition for the factors of production;
resources, technology, raw materials, physical
This keeps salaries from raising, consumption
never enough
be it human
plant, etc.
from growing
and causes a continuous stagnation of
Stagnation causes another problem about whi
been written; talent flight from the LDCs.
Granados, Senior Vice President and Financial
Shearson Lehman Hutton, commented that even
middle and high classes, Latin America
comforts that would be very costly in
nations, the lack of opportunities force
individuals to seek better fortunes abroad.
GNP growth.
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sector would quickly reverse this trend, Garcia-Granados
added.
Population growth causes that when GNP is
measured on a per capita basis, most LDCs show negative
rates of growth. Negative per capita GNP growth assures
that the distribution of wealth continues to polarize.
This is caused by the fact that the more productive
segments of the population, usually the more educated/high
income groups are better prepared to deal with inflation
and the likes, and tend to hold or improve their
conditions. So when the averages decline, the poor usually
get poorer. This is one of the most damaging results of
lack of investment; impossible to revert by government
policies oriented to the redistribution of wealth, and not
to the creation of it.
The economic impact of this polarization on
national savings is not trivial because the rich in
developing nations tend to have low saving rates, and the
poor are not able to save at all. Cline states one form of
this argument in that upper income groups in developing
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countries have relatively low incomes when compared with
those of their counterpart classes in Europe and the U.S.,
whose consumption patterns they nevertheless imitate.''
The relevance of Cline's study for this thesis is that this
aspect contributes to aggravate the impact of capital
flight. The already low per capita savings of developing
nations is stored outside of the country.
But back to the point, among the first
repercussions of the disinvestment caused by capital
outflows is the slow rates of real GNP growth. According
to Thirlwall evidence exists there is a strong
correlation between the rate of growth of income (adjusted
for population growth) and the investment ratio in a given
economy. In developed countries there is a stronger
association between the growth of total income and the
investment ratio, than between growth of per capita income
and the investment ratio. As shown by from Table 4, there
16 Cline, William (1972) Potential Effects of Income
Redistribution on Economic Growth (Latin American Cases),
Praeger Publishers, London, England
17 Thirlwall, A.P. (1974): Inflation, Savings and Growth in
Developing Economies, St. Martin Press, New York, N.Y.
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is a high correlation between the rate of domestic savings
formation, and gross investment, both expressed as a
percent of GNP.
Table 4
Savings and Investment as a % of GNP, Average 1960 - 67
Domestic Gross
Savings (S/Y) Investment (I/Y)
Latin America 16.3 17.7
Africa 13.1 16.7
South Asia 11.3 13.9
East Asia 11.0 15.6
South Europe 21.5 24.9
Middle East 14.8 19.8
Average for LDCs 15.0 17.8
" Developed Countries 21.7 21.2
Source: Pearson Report (1969), Partners in Development,
Pall Mall Press, London, England
I perceive the problem as a self fueling spiral;
a form of vicious circle as depicted in Figure 5.
Investment, is a precondition for economic growth, which is
usually necessary for a country to sustain political
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stability (as the voting population will have every reason
to support the status quo). A politically stable country
is considered to post a lower risk to investors. So when
evaluating investments in risk adjusted terms, this becomes
an incentive motivating normal domestic savings ratios.
High levels of savings provide the capital base for
financial institutions to fuel and lubricate capital
investment, which again allows for economic growth,
starting the circle again.
Figure 5
The Investment Spiral
Political Stability
Insurance
Economic Growth Confidence
Investment Savings
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In this spiral, the "Confidence" link is the only
one insurance can reinforce. Confidence alone will not be
sufficient to sustain flow in the spiral. Other structural
factors, as discussed before, must be addressed if minimal
political stability and order is to be achieved.
The impact of reversed capital flight may be of
tremendous proportions for developing nations. A priori,
as discussed above, resource inflows are expected to
influence positively the domestic savings formation, apart
from supplementing it. Given that the savings rate --
average and marginal -- is regarded as a key economic
indicator, reversed capital flight could improve the credit
worthiness of developing nations. I have not been
concerned for any negative impacts of large capital inflows
into developing nations. Nonetheless, the 70s have seen a
growing debate on this issue, arguing that such flows can
have inflationary effects and that "external resources have
little effect on growth because they tend to work as a
substitute for indigenous savings; the rate of return on
inflow-financed projects
soon becomes a burden on
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is low, and the cost of capital
the recipient economy."
This would not be the case necessarily with
reversed domestic capital inflows, as they would simply go
to form part of the stock of foreign currency reserves of
each country, foreign currency exchanging for the local
currency of importers, without the need to increase the
money supply. In fact, in the United States, foreign
deposits are already counted as part of the money supply,
and as such, turn over against exports and imports, i.e.,
goods and services, and are used in making and unmaking
domestic investments by foreigners.'' The rest of the
argument, I consider total nonsense for the following
reasons:
factor is
Statistical analysis point out that if any
to be associated with underdevelopment, it
single
should
is Das, Dilip K., (1986): Migration of Financial Resources
to Developing Countries, St. Martin Press, New York, N.Y.
19 Kindleberger, Charles P. (1987): International Capital
Movements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
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indisputably be scarce capital. Certainly, it would be an
over simplification to regard economic growth as a matter
of capital accumulation alone, as other factors, as
mentioned before, are also needed in conjunction. But
economic growth is not possible without some increase in
the stock of capital.
An empirical study showed that compared with
the U.S. and Northwestern Europe, capital
investment has been a more important source of
growth for the LDCs of today. For great many of
the LDCs, the inner mechanics of take-off involve
a problem of capital formation, for which there
are materially two ways: domestic savings and
inflow of foreign resources . . .. The fact that
the inflow of foreign resources can catalyze
economic growth cannot be over-emphasized.20
When a country faces binding foreign exchange
constraints -- and more often than not that is the case for
LDCs -- external resource inflows can have a discernible
impact on growth. It matters little if the transfer is of
a small fraction of the domestically available resources.
For example, Manne found that the optimal use of a
relatively small ($75.0 million) increase in foreign
20 Das, Dilip K. (1986)
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exchange availability to Mexico would step up annual growth
of the industrial sector from 5.5% to 8.0%.21 Manne has
been criticized for overly optimistic interpretation of his
results, but nonetheless, the importance of external
resources is clearly made by his research.
Zysman agrees with this position, stating that
fast growing countries have higher rates of savings and
gross investments. Differences in investment, productivity
and growth finally will reflect themselves in the patterns
of each country's development of international trade: fast
growth countries will see their share expand, while slow
2 2
growth countries will see it contract. As stated before,
this is probably the most devastating consequence of flight
capital, as it also occurs in parts of the world that have
some of the highest rates of population growth. Fast
growing populations and slow growing economies are the main
ingredients in a recipe that guarantees turmoil is in store
for the future of a nation.
2 Das, Dilip K. (1986)
22 Zysman, John (1983), Governments, Markets and Growth,
Cornell University Press,
Consequences and Implications of Capital Flight
For The U.S. Banking System
Any return of capital or even the stemming of
capital outflows will have a substantial effect in
strengthening the asset positions of Western bankers in
Latin America. As it stands today, Cline believes the high
exposure of Western bankers in developing nations mean
that, even more than before, the success of export
expansion in those countries will affect not only their own
development, but also the stability of the international
financial system.
In Mexico alone, at the end of 1982 exposure in
relation to capital exceeded 40% in nine of the twelve
largest U.S. banks. Taking Latin America's five biggest
borrowers together (which listed in order of debt size are:
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile), the
23 Cline William R. (1984), Exports of Manufactures from
Developing Countries: Performance and Prospects for Market
Access, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
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exposure of the same dozen banks ranged from a low 82.5% of
capital (for Security Pacific Bank) to a high of 262.8%
(for Manufacturers Hanover Bank), with most banks falling
in a range of 140 - 180 percent. The banking system was,
and still is quite vulnerable.
Though continued increases in loan loss reserves
will cushion the effects of a potential series of loan
defaults from Latin America, the banking system would
suffer deeply if they would ever happen. Please refer to
Table 5 for data on the outstanding foreign debt balances
of the major Latin debtors.
Table 5
Foreign Debt of Major L
at years-end 1988, in t
Brazil $ J
Mexico
Argentina
Venezuela
Source: World Bank est
Street Journal
Latin Debtor Countries
billions of dollars
120.1 Chile
07.4 Peru
59.6 Colombia
35.0 Bolivia
imates as published in The
(March 89)
$ 20.8
19.0
17.2
5.7
Wall
On the other hand, bankers have the dual role of
being the recipients of flight capital, and for years have
enjoyed substantial profits deriving from syndicating loans
to Latin America. So by reducing deposits abroad, a scheme
to reverse capital flight poses a potential dilemma for the
banking industry. The importance of flight capital as a
potential source of deposits to big banks Is evident. It
has obvious advantages over other sources of deposits. The
Swiss experience suggests it is possible to facilitate
flight capital and keep its whereabouts secret in exchange
for below-market interest rates on the deposits they
receive.
Flight capital . . was often different in
practical terms than it appeared to be in
accounting terms. If its origins were
sufficiently dubious, the need for secrecy might
well make it behave less like a "deposit" and more
like the long-term capital resources of the
financial institutions. This is an attribute of
flight capital the Swiss and Hong Kong banks had
long appreciated.24
24 Naylor, R.T. (1987) Hot Money and the Politics of Debt,
The Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, New York
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But U.S. and Western Banks, are more vulnerable
in the area of the quality of their assets (loan
portfolios), than in any reduction of deposits. The
liquidity existing in the market is of such magnitude that
any reduction of deposits stemming from reversed capital
flows to Latin America would not make any significant
difference. If the Japanese or the Arabs removed their
deposits from the U.S., that would make a real difference
to the industry.25
This line of reasoning creates a series of topics
worth pursuing. In the past, the United States has acted
as a banker to the rest of the World, and in particular to
Latin America. The deposits of successful private banks
rise year after year, as they did in the United States.
Other countries and foreign individuals were like firms
banking in the U.S. In my view, the nation historically
pursued policies to attract foreign capital, such as
supportive legislation, income tax exemption on interest
25 Gonzalo de las Heras
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income, federal deposit insurance programs, and allowing
for certain privacy of information.
Opposing this view, in early 1966 a draft memo on
flight capital was circulated among economist at Chase
Manhattan Bank. The memo held that U.S. banks were at a
disadvantage in competing for flight money with the Swiss
and other international money centers, mainly due to the
26following aspectS
a.) ability for the C.I.A.,
and the Justice Department to subpoena
b.) U.S.
regulations which 1
F.B.I., U.S. Treasury
clients records.
restrictive investment and brokerage
imit the secrecy of investment activity.
c.) U.S. estate and withholding tax on foreign
investment.
26 Naylor (1987), page 33.
d.) role
deposits or assets
of the U.S. in
to a freeze as a
the Cold War,
result of it.
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exposing
e.) the
foreign depositors
and inexperienced
especially in fore
generally held view by sophisticated
that U.S. investment managers are naive
in the manipulation of foreign funds,
ign markets.
Chase Manhattan's Bank concerns were unfounded.
As a banking center the U.S. has broad appeal; the dollar
is the world's leading reserve currency, the country has
unmatched stability, negligible probability of revolution
or confiscation, and a negligible probability of
inconvertibility. Those are powerful arguments for
individuals seeking refuge from political risks. As such,
the industry has enjoyed handling the recycling of loan
moneys and being the banker of first choice of wealthy
Latin Americans, (much in the same way it handled the
recycling of the Arab petro-dollars).
I believe this unique function performed by U.S.
banks influenced their behavior, as evidenced by their loan
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allocation, country risk exposure and pricing decisions in
Latin America. This behavior has been less in response to
the actual economic performance analysis of a given
country, than to factors such as the overall lending
environment and each bank's characteristics.
Few Banks, for example review the accuracy of
their initial forecasts against the country's
actual economic performance, and thus do not asses
the reliability of their methods of credit country
risk analysis.
Since the eruption of the debt crisis and
widespread rescheduling exercises, the banks' herd
instinct has prompted a 180-degree switch to a
strong lending bias against developing countries .
. .. The changes in the international environment
have been paralleled by improvements in the
quality and use of country risk analysis by all
segments of the international community.27
Hopefully then, reversing the flows of capital
flight would reinforce the individual economies in the
region, and that coupled with improved country risk
analysis and the strengthening of the asset positions of
27 Feinberg, Richard E. and Kallab, Valleriana (1984):
Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World,
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, Conn.
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the banks, would again open the doors for badly needed
lines of credit for the region.
The failure to achieve these goals expose the
banking industry to be pressed to accept de facto actions
by the federal government, that concerned with the
political and economical stability of the LDCs is pressing
239for the outright forgiveness of the loans. At stake are
an estimated $400 billion in outstanding debt to the
banking industry, which needs to be drawn out of the
"uncollectible accounts" into performing loans in order to
minimize the damage of the write-downs on the bank's
balance sheets.
As proposed now, only those countries that meet
the stringent criteria of the federal government will be
eligible for debt reduction plans. Countries which impose
strong IMF-approved economic reforms and can show they are
recapturing their citizens' private capital from abroad,
20 As published in the Wall Street Journal, the Bush
administration announced in March 1989 that it was
supporting a proposal to cut debt principal and interest
payments by 20 % to 39 debtor countries.
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will be entitled to use the special measures to cut their
debt burden presently being proposed by Washington.29
Assuming the details of these new proposals from the Bush
administration get ironed-out, any program that entices the
return of private capital would be a valuable tool to help
a country obtain such concessions.
Restoring private financial flows from nationals
to the region would have major positive effects for the
banking industry. Helping to achieve it, is where the idea
of investment insurance for locals may play an important
role. If the region regains its credit worthiness and
returns to the marketplace, new loans and foreign capital
inflows are more likely to happen. As a corollary to the
improvement of the banks holdings of LDC debt, the market
will reward the banks with substantial price increases of
their stock. Even though the proposed plans of debt
29 U.S. Strategy on World Debt Faces Hurdles, The Wall
Street Journal, March 13, 1989.
30 Stocks of major banks holding large Latin American
portfolios surged March 16th, 1989 upon the announcement by
assistant secretary Brady of the U.S. Treasury's debt
reduction plan. The Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1989.
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reduction would imply the banks would loose some money, in
exchange, through World Bank and IMF guarantees, they would
acquire more credit-worthy debt and thus make future losses
less likely. Significantly, most losses would be absorbed
by the loan-loss reserve provisions already existing in the
bank's books.
One element of this plan, the Banks must watch
for is the proposal to identify, and possibly tax on behalf
of Latin governments, foreign deposits in U.S. banks.
Although this idea is aimed at making U.S. deposits less
attractive for Latin depositors and thus contribute to stem
capital flight, and thereby contributing to retain capital
for the repayment of debt, it can trigger exactly the
opposite reaction.
Taxing only citizens of developing nations poses
innumerable problems. Among the most obvious ones lies the
fact that such policy goes contrary to the spirit of the
U.S. constitution and as such, could not be applied only to
citizens of arbitrarily selected countries. (And applying
it across the board would cause devastating effects to the
liquidity of the financial markets.) Second, the
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intended
effect would be eliminated if the same policies are not
consistently followed by Switzerland and other major
European banking centers. Latin investors and money
mangers at the U.S. brokerage houses are not stupid, and
they would simply shift their customer's deposits to
friendlier pastures. Third, it can be practically
impossible to enforce because of the difficulty to identify
the true nationality of accounts. Deposits in the name of
corporations domiciled in "tax-haven" nations guarantee the
secrecy of whom the real owners are, and legally such
accounts bear the nationality of that host country. It is
not by
do not
coincidence that those so called tax-haven
have capital flight problems.
nations
Clearly making the point of the difficulty of
tracing accounts, William Mulroland, CEO of The Bank of
Montreal claimed in the autumn of 1985 when queried on the
efficacy of the bank regulatory apparatus stated: "I can
hide money in the twinkling of an eye from all the
bloodhounds that can be put on the case, and I would be so
far ahead of them there would never be a hope of unraveling
the trail
that this
means.
I am not kidding you.
sort of thing can be
Technology
done through
86
today means
electronic
31 Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce, Proceedings October 2, 1985. (11:24)
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Consequences and Implications of Capital Flight
For The United States
There is serious concern in the U.S. for the
stability of Latin America.
Why the [U.S.] government has taken such an
active role in the crisis is not difficult to
discern. On broad foreign policy grounds, Latin
America has always been regarded as a region
important to U.S. national interests. From the
moment Mexico's difficulties began, there was
never any doubt among policy makers that the
security of the United States, rather than just
Mexico's. was at stake -- that the United States
too would be threatened by serious economic or
political instability south of the border. Nor
was there any doubt that the contagion of disorder
could spread to other Latin American nations as
well. [The U.S.] simply could not ignore the
potential for chaos in its own backyard, which
might be sparked by financial default.32
Without doubt, U.S. trade has been hurt ever
since the debt-crisis erupted seven years ago. The
administration fears that without easing the staggering
32 Feinberg, Richard E. and Kallab, Valleriana (Editors)
Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World,
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, Conn.
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debt burden, fragile Latin democracies -- which have
receded or achieved little or no economic growth since 1982
-- might fall, sparking takeovers by the radical left or
the military right. Also a growing number of economists
think a reduction of Latin debt, the return of private
capital that has fled and the restoration of private
financial flows in Latin America is key for continued U.S.
economic growth.
By The Wall Street Journal's estimates, U.S.
businesses have lost $75 billion in exports since the debt
crisis forced Latin nations to devote ever more of their
foreign exchange earnings to service loans.33 Yet, this
figure can be quite conservative if one considers that by
1982 the region had surpassed all but Western Europe as a
market for U.S. goods and that Mexico alone, became the
third largest customer of the United States. Once the
crisis broke out, additional to loosing export business,
commerce and real estate in the American south was
seriously damaged.
The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1989.
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Government officials never tired of stressing how
many exports, hence how many jobs, would be lost if
something were not done for troubled debtor nations.
Washington's efforts to support these countries' financial
stability could yield significant foreign policy dividends
and domestic political gains. The motives were summarized
by Paul Volker:
The effort to manage the international debt
problem goes beyond the vague and generalized
concerns about political and economic stability of
borrowing countries . . .. The effort encompasses
also the protection of our own financial stability
and the markets for what we produce best.'3
The natural markets for what the U.S. produced
best were hurting. With South America alone, the U.S.
trade balance shifted from a $1.1 billion surplus in 1981
to a $11.7 billion deficit in 1985 as a result of a 9.1%
fall in exports combined with a 35% surge in imports. This
turnaround largely reflects the LDC debt crisis.
* Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World,
page 115.
picture of
U.S. trade
from the
mineral f
U.S. will
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picture of
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These figures do not yet give us the whole
how much the Latin American debt crisis affected
Consider the following reasoning, and deduct
tally of the balance of trade all imports of
uels and lubricants. The presumption is that the
import oil if it needs it, so to include it in
ce of trade with Latin America distorts the
a true loss of competitive advantage or of the
roblems suffered by either part.
So if oil is taken out of the computations, in
1981 the U.S. enjoyed a trade surplus with South America of
$8.1 billion, $2.2 billion with the Caribbean basin and
$10.8 billion with Mexico, for a whooping total of $21.1
billion in one year alone. This surplus deteriorated to a
net deficit of $1.2 billion in 1987, caused by a decline in
exports to the region and a surge in imports. Note that
these figures are not adjusted for inflation; so, had the
region not suffered the drastic strains of the debt crisis,
its purchases should have maintained a similar pace with
U.S. imports from the region.
Table 6
U.S. Balance of Trade By Regions,
(Imports Exclude Trade of Mineral
1981, in millions,
Fuels and Lubricants)
Region
Imports Exports
Africa 2508
South Africa 2508
Planned Economies 3181
Middle East 1468
Other Asia 7948
East Asian NICs 21914
Non E.C. Europe 8717
European Community 37324
Japan 39878
Australia 2641
New Zealand 819
Sub-Total 128906
Canada 37133
Mexico 7007
Caribbean Basin 4414
South America 9539
Sub-Total
Total
7594 5086
2910 402
7872 4691
13934 12466
8030 82
14781 -7133
12795 4078
51672 14348
21640 -18238
5179 2538
920 101
147327 18421
39399 2266
17780 10773
6590 2176
17675 8136
58093 81444 23351
186999 228771 41772
Source: author's computations compiled from the
1987 U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights, (1988)
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Trade and
Investment Analysis.
Balance
Table 7
U.S. Balance of Trade By Regions, 1987, in millions
(Imports Exclude Trade of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants)
Region Imports
Africa 2229
South Africa 2048
Planned Economies 7984
Middle East 3260
Other Asia 13958
East Asian NICs 61028
Non E.C. Europe 14386
European Community 80540
Japan 87982
Australia 2877
New Zealand 1180
277472
Canada 64730
Mexico 16541
Caribbean Basin 5267
South America 14039
Exports
4209
1281
5713
7970
8273
22856
8872
59731
27808
5467
814
152994
59330
14569
7130
12948
Balance % Change
1980
-767
-2271
4710
-5685
-38172
-5514
-20809
-60174
2590
-366
-124478
-5400
-1972
1863
-1091
38.93%
-190.80%
-48.41%
37.78%
-6932.93%
535. 15%
-135.21%
-145.03%
329.94%
102.05%
-362.38%
-675.74%
-238.31%
-18.31%
85.62%
-13.41%
Sub-Total 100577 93977 -6600 -28.26%
Total 378049 246971 -131078 -313.79%
Note: % Change column compares the Balance of Trade of 1981
with that of 1987.
Source: author's computations compiled from the
1987 U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights, (1988)
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Trade and
Investment Analysis.
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The region is decidedly one of the best trading
partners for the United States. The geographical
comparative advantage of the U.S. is evident when noted
that during the same period, the balance of trade with
other key trading partners deteriorated at a much faster
pace. For example, Japan went from a deficit of $18.2
billion in 1891 to a deficit of $60.2 billion in 1987.
Europe went from a surplus of $8.0 billion to a deficit of
$20.8 billion!
So, the point made from these chapters is that
both the U.S. as a whole, and the banking industry in
particular, have a lot to gain if local entrepreneurs
return their assets to their countries in Latin America.
In attempting to confirm if an insurance solution can
realistically be proposed, the next chapter will establish
if coverage is feasible by studying actuarial country risk
analysis, what type of entity could provide coverage and at
what cost.
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Chapter 2
An Insurance Solution to Capital Flight?
At the beginning of my research I placed an
emphasis in establishing the feasibility of providing
political risk insurance to local investors in their own
countries. The feasibility has to be determined for
several players: the host government involved, the
institution providing coverage and the investor's
purchasing insurance. The host government must accept the
thesis that some citizens require an advantage or special
protection in order to maintain retained earnings locally.
The institution launching the program must find political
risk insurance profitable or congruent with its overall
scope. The investor must accept the program and find it
attractive.
the
this
This emphasis directed me first into establishing
potentiality of accurately measuring country risks, as
was the key to set premium rates. The second step was
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to analyze the likelihood that such coverage be provided by
different types of institutions. Private insurance
companies, the U.S. government, private banks and
multilateral institutions were considered. The third and
last step was to establish the investor's attitude towards
this program. Following is the development of each of
these steps:
Country Risk Assessment
Determining country risk is a crucial area for
any entity providing political risk insurance. For many
reasons its measurement is totally impossible in an exact
quantified manner. The main reason is that political risks
are both a consequence and a cause of financial and
economic problems. This interdependent relationship,
linked to the inherent subjective evaluations needed to be
done when one measures elements as "political leadership,
or quality of the bureaucracy" 35 of one country, make for
this evaluation a most difficult one. Private and public
As measured by the International Country Risk Guide
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entities have developed different means of measuring all
assumed relevant factors, giving these evaluations
numerical values and plugging them into mathematical models
that produce ranking indices usable as a comparable
measuring stick.
Statistical Modes of Sovereign Risk analysis
In academic literature, the analysis of
sovereign risk consists of the employment of statistical
models to estimate the probability of default by debtor
nations. Treating the latter as the dependent variable,
researchers have applied statistical procedures to the
problem of identifying the significant independent or
explanatory variables influencing the probability of
default. Put simply. the problem is to estimate:
Probability of Default = f(economic variables)
If researchers could identify economic variables that
influence probability of default on sovereign lending,
analysts would be able to tract that variable over time
with the purpose of identifying the countries most at risk
of default.
Heffernan"
representative list of
tested for statistical
identifies the
explanatory variables that
significance in predicting
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following
have been
defau lt:
Current Account Variables
Debt Service Ratio (DSR):
service payments to the value of
services.
ratio of
exports
external debt
of goods and
Goods and
that for
external
Ratio of External Debt to the Value of Exports of
Services (D/Ex): the denominator is the same as
the DSR and the numerator consists of total
sovereign debt.
Ratio of Imports to GNP (IM/GNP): this ratio
attempts to capture a measure of flexibility when it comes
to cutting back on the import bill. It also provides an
indication of the degree to which national income growth
*6 Heffernan, Shelag, (1986) Sovereign Risk Analysis, Allen
& Unwin, London
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will be affected should a country have to reduce its import
bill in response to debt servicing difficulties.
Ratio of International Reserves to the Imports of
Goods and Services (RES/IM): this ratio is an indicator of
short term liquidity problems. Some researchers express it
in terms of months.
Growth Rate of Exports (GEX): one can expect a
negative correlation between this variable and the
probability of rescheduling foreign debt.
Variance in Export Earnings (VAREX): stable
export earnings reduce the probability of defaults, thus
the higher the variance, the higher the probability of
defaults.
Ratio of Current Account Deficit to the Export of
Goods and Services (CAX): this ratio is meant to provide an
indication of the country's new borrowing requirements in a
given year.
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Capital Account Variables
Ratio of Capital Inflows to Debt Service (K/DS):
capital inflows contribute to the country's foreign
exchange receipts, which in turn ease the servicing of
external debt. There is a negative relationship between
this variable and sovereign risk.
Ratio of Amortization to External Debt (A/D):
this is probably the most controversial of all explanatory
variables employed in statistical models. The inverse of
this ratio is supposed to represent the average maturity of
a country's external debt.
Commitment per Capita (C/POP): this is the ratio
of new debt contracted during a given year to population.
Other Variables
Ratio of International Reserves to External Debt
(RES/D): expressed as a percentage of total outstanding
external debt, as this ratio rises,
default declines.
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the probability of
Per Capita Income (Y/GNP): this is and indicator
of a country's living standards; the higher they are, the
greater the consumption of non-essential goods, making for
greater flexibility in the adjustment of consumer patterns.
Share of
s indicator signa
the country: one
s ratio as a good
nvestment in National Income (I/GNP):
s the importance placed on investment
should look for a steady increase of
indicator of a reduction in risk.
Ratio
indication of
production.
of External Debt
foreign claims
to GNP
on a
(D/GNP):
debtor's
gives an
country
Ratio of
ratio of reserves
liquidity.
Reserves to
to imports,
GNP
this
(RES/GNP): like the
is an indicator of
thi
by
thi
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Monetary Indicators: these indicators try to
identify countries with strict money supply growth targets,
which makes them less likely to suffer problems of domestic
inflation, which in turn makes them less competitive in
world markets and hence prone to balance of payments
problems.
World Credit Liquidity (L
supply side variable: the degree of
world economy.
Ratio of Domestic Savings
with a high savings ratio will be
of external financing in the future
Per Capita Rate of Econo
an indicator of how quickly per ca
thus providing a measure of the
economy.
): attempts to capture a
credit abundance in the
to GNP (S): a country
less dependent on forms
mic Growth (G): this is
pita incomes are rising,
general health of the
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A Practical Application
Let us look at one concrete example of how these
concepts are applied i
Insurance Association.
provides credit risk i
country in the world.
Government agency that
export of American goods
n practice at The Foreign Credit
FCIA is a division of Eximbank that
nsurance to U.S. exporters to any
(Eximbank is the independent U.S.
helps to finance and facilitate the
and services.)
FCIA has deve
rank countries accordin
of operating, investing
loped a system whi
g to the political
or lending
ch allows it to
or economic risk
to a citizen of that
country. But in a U.S. government entity, given the
political implications of a poor ranking being given to a
friendly nation, the same must be kept confidential, and
great efforts are made to have FCIA's independently
obtained rankings match those of Eximbank.
This is diff
perspective from that
from many commercial
icult because FCIA has a different
of Eximbank, and probably different
banks, mainly because the term of
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their exposures are not the same. FCIA insures mainly
receivables that are short term (one to twelve months), so
their concern is the likelihood of this country, and
naturally, the buyer, to be able to service its debt within
the course of twelve months.
This system of ranking countries
series of indices that are calculated
internally. Among them are:
- balance of payments,
- foreign currency reserves,
- the ability to raise capital
capital markets,
- dependence on one commodity to
exchange,
- priorities to provide foreign
imports versus others,
- political stability, and many
in the
is based on a
and compounded
international
generate foreign
exchange for certain
others. 7
As per interview with Byron M. Shoulton, Economist at
FCIA.
Not one variable
major weight than
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or measurement index has necessarily a
the others.
With this information each country is ranked by
FCIA's staff on a scale from one to ten every quarter. One
being the least credit worthy, ten being the most. Then
each country is put into market groupings simply identified
as A, B, C, D and E. Each grouping is then actuarialy
assigned a different premium for insurance coverage.
"A", the highest ranking, would group
without balance-of-payment or balance-of-trade
This would include countries not dependent on one
or industry. Germany, Japan or the U.K. would fa
category.
countries
problems.
commodity
11 in this
The "B" category is identified as satisfactory
all areas, except having one or two problems, for exampl
a weak financial sector one might be concerned about.
this category would fall countries like Taiwan
Singapore.
in
e,
In
or
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A "IC"t market is seen by FCIA as a country in
transition. For example Saudi Arabia could fall here if
oil prices are low and they are confronting balance of
payment problems. (Sometimes specific sectors of the
economy would be given this ranking, and the government
itself a higher one.)
"D" markets are countries with serious problems
servicing exterior debt and facing structural problems in
its economy forcing it to borrow heavily. Most developing
nations fall under this category.
In an
Nicaragua
"E" market no
or Peru would
coverage would be offered at
fall in this category at this
In order to support its internal rankings FCIA
relies also on third parties, that prepare independent
evaluations. One of them, published by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a publication of International
Reports, Inc., provides a detailed country-by-country
breakdown of the comparative risks of operating in,
all.
date.
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investing in, or lending to particular countries using a
three-dimensional evaluation system. This system attempts
to weigh the composite risk, and express the disaggregated
political, financial and economic risks by an indicator.
The main risk ratings it provides are broken in
three. The first one, measuring Political Risks, is broken
down into thirteen political indicators for each country,
then assigning each factor a weighted point value. A
detail of these indicators is presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Political Risk Indicators
Points
- economic planning failures 12
- economic expectations versus reality 12
- political leadership 12
- external conflict risk 10
- corruption in government 6
- military in politics 6
- organized religion in politics 6
- law and order tradition 6
- racial and nationality tensions 6
- political terrorism 6
- civil war risks 6
- political party development 6
- quality of the bureaucracy 6
100
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The second rating, Financial Risk, is broken into
five indicators of financial performance with weighted
values assigned to risk factors identified for each
country. A detail of these factors is presented below in
Table 9.
Table 9
Financial Risk Indicators
Points
- loan default or unfavorable loan restructuring 10
- delayed payment of suppliers' credit 10
- repudiation of contracts by governments 10
- losses from exchange controls 10
- expropriation of private investments 10
50
economic
country.
The last rating, Economic Risks, encompasses six
indicators that have also been identified for each
Table 10 lists these indicators in detail.
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Table 10
Economic Risk Indicators
inf lation
debt service as a percent of exports
international liquidity
collection experience
current account deficit as a % of exports
foreign exchange (parallel market indicators)
Points
10
10
5
5
15
5
50
In calculating the aggregate political
and economic risk, the following formula is used
financial
CPFER (country X) = 0.5 (PR+FP+ER),
where CPFER
Risk rating;
= Composite Political, Financial and Economic
and
Political
Financial
Economic
Risk indicators
Risk indicators
Risk indicators
PR
FR
ER
= Total
= Total
= Total
The highest overall
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Even with these measuring systems, the past
experience of entities like FCIA in this area of country
risk assessment has been mixed. To understand the
magnitude of the losses that can be caused when one
country's economic and political systems are in distress,
lets look at the case of Mexico in the 1982/83 years.
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For FCIA, Mexico alone caused for over $380
million in losses during that year. So even after 24 years
of profitability, the size of these claims convinced
several of the underwriters and re-insurers of FCIA to pull
out, forcing Eximbank to pick up the risk coverage in the
political area. The underwriters agreed to continue
carrying the coverage of commercial risks.
FCIA is, as its name suggests, an association of
the 16 largest insurance companies in the U.S., and even
for them, sharing any part of the political risk has been
unattractive. To hedge this exposure, FCIA requires from
its customers that they spread their risks in several
countries. They also impose sub limits per customer, but
to date, have never imposed on themselves a limit of
country exposure. The establishment of a country limit is
the basis for limiting the total risks of cross border
transactions '. Such a limit could be expressed as a
percent of paid-in capital and reserves to assure that in
se Krayenbuehl, Thomas E. (1985) Country Risk: Assessment
and Monitoring, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath Company,
Lexington, Ma.
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the event of a catastrophic loss in one country, major
claims could not carry the organization into insolvency.
113
Entities That Could Insure Political Risk
Private Insurance Companies
In the market exist already many private and
government-controlled entities that provide some form of
political or sovereign risk insurance. The reason to
address the question at all is that the program, as
conceived in this thesis, poses a new type of risk from any
being commercially covered today. It is uncertain if
private insurers, banks, governments or multilateral
institutions will be able to take such big risks in any
sizable volume, even though all have a real stake in the
outcome and success of revitalizing the economies of
developing nations.
Entities like OPIC from the public sector, and
Lloyds of London, American Insurance Group (AIG) or
Citicorp International Trade Indemnity Corporation (CITI)
from the private one, have been providing different forms
of sovereign and political risk insurance for many years.
Their programs are available and designed to cover foreign
114
assets of domestic companies. None of them though, have an
existing "off-the-shelf" product to offer to a Latin
citizen wishing to insure his exposure in his own country.
Although private insurers do not rule out the possibility
that given a concrete request they would consider quoting
coverage on a case by case basis, CITI's officers explained
that this coverage entailed a completely different risk
than that posted by insuring foreign investment in a
country. For details of the risks covered, please refer to
a sample copy of the policies offered by Citicorp
International Trade Indemnity Corporation included in
Appendix 3.
Richard Stern, Vice President and General Counsel
for Citicorp Insurance explained that the difference lies
on the issue of leverage on negotiations of claims and the
seeking of compensation from a government. For example the
nationalization of a domestically owned bank or farm in El
Salvador would not disturb good economic relations with any
foreign government. Acting under the legal system of that
country, repayment (if there is one), can be in the form of
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worthless"' long term government bonds issued in local
currency. The insured party would find it has no leverage
to influence the local authorities to provide fair
compensation, much less expect to receive it in U.S.
Dollars. It cannot expect to be supported by any real
pressure from foreign governments and there will be no
outcry in the international media because the affected
party is a subject of the laws of the country effecting the
expropriation. Thus, insuring citizens in their own
countries constituted for the insurance industry a "new"
type of political risk for which little or no actuarial
experience exists.
Byron Shoulton,"* economist at the Foreign
Commerce Insurance Association, confirmed that in the case
of a claim, the insurance company would pay the insured and
it would have a recourse against the host country by taking
Depending on the issuing government, market conditions,
terms, and the currency of issue, the market resale value of
these debentures has dropped to as low as 3 cents on the
Dollar.
40 Byron M. Shoulton, economist at the Foreign Credit
Insurance Association
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possession of whichever compensation might have been
offered. If the insurance company believes it has not been
adequately compensated, it can go to the world courts to
file a suit. But the problem here is that this court has
no authority to enforce its verdicts. Other than effecting
political pressures and the governments' concern over their
public or international images, more often than not,
governments tend to ignore these verdicts.
On the other
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As compared with other entities, private insurers
felt they did not enjoy any special leverages to secure
favorable negotiations of claims. Other than removing a
country from the list of nations where coverage is
provided, they held no means of exerting pressure. The
expected result of such a measure was considered to be
inconsequent in influencing a government's decision to
carry out a nationalization policy or to provide adequate
compensation afterwards.
As one way to alleviate this concern, insurance
companies would like to subscribe agreements with the host
governments of the nations before they are to provide
coverage. The idea is to agree ahead of time on matters
like how to establish exchange rates; arbitration courts
accepted to both; mechanisms for appraisal of market value
of properties and, if possible, the seniority of their debt
as compared to all previously acquired commitments by the
country. (Please refer to Appendix 4 for a copy of one
such agreement subscribed between the Governments of the
United States of America and Costa Rica relating to the
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investment guarantees of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.)
Regarding the issue of Latin American governments
granting a different seniority to insurance company claims,
de las Heras'1 stated that it is not at all possible to
grant any special privileges to insurers. All countries
that have been forced to renegotiate their debt in exchange
of rescheduling payments -- and this is almost all of them
-- have committed to several points. One of which binds
them not to grant any superior seniority or guarantees to a
new lender without offering the same benefit to existing
ones. This condition is known as the "negative pledge
clause."
When asked if it would be possible to obtain
senior claims on a country's assets abroad as compensation
for an insurance claim, Meneses42 explained that no one has
41 Gonzalo de las Heras, Senior Vice President at Morgan
Guarantee Trust Company, responsible for foreign lending.
42 Victor Meneses, Senior Corporate officer for Latin
America and Africa at Citibank, a subsidiary of Citicorp.
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a claim on any country's assets abroad. Not even World
Bank or the International Monetary Fund have a lean on a
country's assets abroad. Countries are very sensitive
about hypothecation of assets and in many countries doing
so would be against the constitution. Additional to this,
there is no official seniority either. Theoretically all
debtors are "pari passu," though in practice they are not
treated as such, legally they are all equal.
Countries do tend to pay the IMF or the World
Bank before they pay private banks, but this is not because
they have an obligation to do so. For example, as of June
30, 1988 at The World Bank only 2.3% of the $127.9 billion
in loans outstanding to developing nations were in a non-
accrual basis 4 3 . (In fact this figure includes principal
outstanding not yet overdue. Past due principal plus non
accrued interest represents one half of one percent of the
whole portfolio of loans outstanding. Included among past
due nations from Latin America were Peru, Nicaragua and
Financial Statement, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) as of
June 30, 1988.
Panama.) This outstandin
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The reality is that investment flows have been
kept separate from the debt problem. So during the time
Latin countries have struggled restructuring their debt,
investments have been coming in and out of the region
without any restrictions. So in a peculiar pragmatic sense
(for Latin American governments) equity is superior in
seniority to debt. But again, this is "de facto" and not
law. For example, dividends keep coming out of Argentina,
but not interest or principal on private and official debt
to private banks. Again, like in the case of World Bank,
this is happening in order not to discourage foreign
investment. U.S. banks could go to court on this issue,
but have chosen not to do so.
So, it is highly unlikely and politically
suicidal that a country's government, in an effort to
attract a program of investment insurance such as the one
considered in this thesis, will offer an insurer, and in
fact anybody, any superior claims on its assets. On the
other hand, no support should be expected from the U.S.
government regarding official sequestering of accounts if a
foreign government is not performing on its agreements with
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an American insurance company. Meneses suggests that has
been the case, even when OPIC (a U.S. government owned
entity) has lost money due to the nationalization of
assets. The well known exemption of Iran, that took place
a few years ago was an extreme case where the government
acted on presidential orders. In that case, it was a
reaction to the hostages issue and it does not constitute a
precedent to be taken into account for political insurance
risk assessment purposes.
According to de las Heras, the problem for
insurance companies providing this type of coverage starts
when they look at Latin American countries who seemingly
cannot pay their debts to anyone -- be it private banks or
foreign governments. Why should they offer insurance to
their nationals if they cannot expect to collect on
recourse claims? Recourse claims against a government,
would lie for all practical purposes, in third place,
behind the Paris Club agreements and the already existing
private and public debt to banks and multilateral entities.
And, as mentioned before, most developing countries are not
paying even them!
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The expectation of being able to convince a
private insurer to underwrite comprehensive coverage for
political risks in Latin America, and particularly if it is
to include local investors, seems highly unlikely.
Shoulton suggested that the private sector would not be
willing to bear these risks alone, and would look towards
the government for a joint venture, a subsidy or a certain
type of guarantee. If this was so, it would have to be a
government outside the region in order to have any
credibility in the market.
Another reason for private insurers to seek out
the help of the government before attempting to provide
comprehensive coverage for political risks, stems from one
of the most important barriers preventing their entry into
the business. That is the existence of OPIC and other
government-operated insurance schemes, that by offering
subsidized insurance, make private insurance unprofitable.
As in other instances of market distortion, it is
in the best interest of insurance buyers to buy
insurance when it is priced below the market rate.
Since OPIC's rate is uniform across countries
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(e.g., 0.6% for manufacturing operations), it
clearly pays to insure in risky nations (mostly
LDCs) and not insure in low-risk nations. Thus
government plans are faced with the problem of
adverse selection.
Right now, governments in the region provide
outside investors with assurances that they can freely take
out their dividends over time, and if they so desire can
repatriate their original investments at any moment.
Governments provide these assurances because they are the
prerequisite investors require in the first place before
coming in. Even with these government guarantees,
insurance is needed because of the high risk that officials
will change their minds or that the countries entirely
change the ideologies and policies of their governments.
4 Shapiro, Alan C. (1982) Multinational Financial
Management, Allyn & Bacon Inc., Boston, Ma.
125
Private Banks
At first thought,
comes to mind to provide
themselves. Not only do
increased investment in the
ones to hold any leverage to
the natural institution that
this insurance is the banks
they have most to gain from
region, but they are the only
enforce a claim against them.
The comparative advantage of banks in
enforcing contracts with LDC borrowers is further
strengthened by the role of the IMF and, to a
lesser degree, the World Bank. Both institutions
have leverage because they represent a continuing
source of finance and because they play a special
role in signaling to other financial institutions
whether to stop lending to a particular country.
I am presuming this leverage
lending to a country can be stopped if
honoring its international agreements.
experience, they have the clout and they
stems from the fact
a government is not
Banks have the
have the financial
45 Lessard, Donald (1985), International Finance for Less
Developed Countries: the Unfulfilled Promise, working paper
presented to World Bank as background for the 1985 World
Development Report.
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can make or break a country.
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the level of country risk,
potential investors is the
funds in the world financial
dry up if a country gets
community.
The problem for another type of organization to
offer private insurance coverage in the LDCs stems from the
fact private holders of debt or other type of investments,
as insurance contracts would be, do not obtain similar help
in the enforcement of their claims. Further making the
case for private banks offering this insurance coverage is
the previous experience of the U.S. government and that of
other countries that have attempted to impose sanctions in
the case of expropriations. Usually, the sanctions or
mechanisms designed to react to these events have failed
because of the difficulty of establishing damages and
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assigning fault, and hence, obtaining the collective
response required to make the penalties effective.
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promoted by a third party not directly associated with the
banks, and can be kept at arms length," stated Meneses
during interview.
Serious legal limitations, coupled with the
existing exposure of the industry as a group, lead me to
believe banks are not a realistic alternative to undertake
this project independently. The magnitude of potential
expropriation losses may bankrupt an underwriter, unless
that loss is only a small percentage of its total
operations. With the existing levels of exposure already
held by this industry, far exceeding healthy levels, it is
doubtful the market will let them bear additional risks.
If a third party gets a program started, banks will
probably provide their support, albeit on a limited basis.
129
The U.S. Government
When interviewing officers of the U.S.
government's branches that are involved in promoting the
development of Latin America, they enthusiastically
considered the idea of an insurance solution to the problem
of capital flight as feasible one. Walter Bastian,
Director of the Caribbean Basin Program at the Department
of Commerce, even considered it possible for such a program
to be provided by some branch of the U.S. government.
Bastian deemed it would be politically acceptable to obtain
support from Congress for an insurance program, even though
he recognized funds for his own program were being
tightened due to the budget deficit.
Any program that has a cost to the taxpayer, or
is perceived as having one, would be politically very
difficult to sell in the context of Congress' fight against
the dual budget deficits. It is not difficult to imagine
the reaction of the media and that of local stakeholders if
the government advises domestic farmers that their
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subsidies will be curtailed, military bases have to be
closed, municipal governments are receiving reduced amounts
of Federal funds and now presents a program to guarantee
investments of the rich in Latin America. It would be
political suicide, no matter how much sense it made to
strengthen U.S.'s trading partners to the south, and the
possible long term benefits of this program to the nation.
This argument leads me to believe that it would
not be politically feasible to support a program of direct
insurance by the U.S. government. Not even one providing
guarantees to an entity underwriting coverage. Even though
guarantees are not accounted for as a budget item until
needed, the potential benefits to the country are too far
removed from the voter's perspective. The rest of the
world, and in particular the small nations of the Caribbean
basin, look to the U.S. for leadership. But now the
country is looking inwardly to find the solutions to its
own multitude of problems.
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Multilateral Organizations
An international multilateral agency, providing
insurance without the specific intent of protecting the
citizens of one particular country is the last alternative
considered that may be politically and economically viable
for all the parties involved. Presuming insurance is the
solution for capital flight, the World Bank opted to
provide this service directly. The World Bank approved in
April of 1988 the creation of the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), recogniz
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programs among member governments, and between them and the
international business community.
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Chapter 3
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
World Bank is in the process of obtaining
ratification from its member countries, to the convention
establishing MIGA. As of January 1989, the convention has
been signed by 73 nations totaling 74% of the agency's
authorized capital of U.S.$ 1,082,000,000. As expressed by
Christophe S. Bellinger, guarantee officer at MIGA, the
agency's board had just approved the underwriting of
insurance coverage, though none had been sold yet. It was
Mr. Bellinger's function to seek eligible projects in order
to start operations.
Scope of Guarantee Program'
7
The scope of MIGA's guarantee program is
determined by "eligibility requirements" -- tests which
47 Taken from MIGA's Investment Guarantee Program general
information booklet published by MIGA itself.
must be met if and investment is to qualify
for coverage by MIGA. These tests relate to
the country in which the investment is to b
time and type of investment, and the type o
which coverage is sought.
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Eligible Investors
To qualify for coverage by MIGA, investors must
be nationals of a member country other than the one in
which the proposed investment is made (host country). For
the purpose of this test, a corporation is considered a as
a national of a member country if either of the following
conditions are met. First, it is incorporated and has its
principal place of business in a member country, or second,
the majority of its capital stock is owned by nationals of
member countries.
coverage
domiciled
country),
As a result of this alternative test MIGA
is available to foreign-owned corporations
in a member country (other than the host
as well as to companies established in a non-
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member country but majority owned by nationals of member
countries. Eligible investors include both private
individuals and corporations. Publicly-owned corporations
qualify for coverage if they operate on a commercial basis.
Also, on application by the prospective host-
government, eligibility can also be extended nationals of
the host country who plan to transfer investment assets
from abroad. The extension of MIGA's guarantee protection
to host country nationals is designed to encourage the
repatriation of flight capital. For this purpose, Miga may
also provide coverage to offshore investment funds through
which host country nationals recycle flight capital into
their own countries. Note that MIGA's broad delineation of
qualified investors should enable it to afford uniform
guarantee protection to those investors from different
countries
country.
who jointly finance a project in a developing
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By insuring only new investments, MIGA falls
short of providing comprehensive coverage to existing
investment in the area, and I contend, this fact alone will
prevent this project form stemming capital flight
originating from individuals overly exposed with existing
operations. In addition to this, requiring the application
from a host country's government in order to provide
new
include
where
only
the
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coverage to nationals who plan to return assets from
abroad, will cause an inordinate roadblock for Latin
investor. Here MIGA has misunderstood the inherently
secretive nature of investors that have spent their lives
covertly purchasing dollars in the black market, in order
to create their own financial security abroad. It would be
surprising if any investor in fact goes to his government
and requests it to apply for the political risk insurance
it requires for the return of $10 million he has stashed
away through the years.
On the other hand, the fact any new investment
coming from a member country into a developing one can be
insured, opens one major door for the return of previously
flown capital. One that does not require the intervention
of the host government and that also allows for certain
privacy of information; I am referring to the fact any
Latin investor holding liquid assets in the United States
can use those funds to capitalize, say a Florida
corporation. That new entity would qualify under the terms
of this agreement to seek insurance coverage, as it would
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be treated as an American corporation investing in a
developing nation.
Covered Risks
Like most investment guarantee agencies, MIGA
offers coverage of three broadly defined types of non-
commercial risk, namely:
- Transfer and convertibility restrictions (such
as restrictions on the repatriations of dividends and other
investment proceeds in freely usable currency). This
coverage embraces both active blockage, which implies the
explicit denial of the conversion and/or transfer of local
funds by the host government through laws, decrees,
regulations, or administrative acts; and passive blockage,
where administrative or bureaucratic delays hold up the
transfer and/or conversion for more than 90 days (or as
many days as agreed by the contract) of the investor's
application for such transfer. Coverage also includes
exchange rate discrimination, i.e., the inability to
convert local currency except at an exchange less favorable
than a reference rate of exchange specified in
guarantee contract.
- Expropriation and similar measures.
coverage is designed to broadly encompass direct, indirect
and creeping expropriation. The pertinent language of the
MIGA Convention includes "any legislative action or
administrative action or omission attributable to the host
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of
a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a
substantial benefit from, his investment." MIGA's General
Conditions of Guarantee explicitly extend coverage to
"creeping expropriation," which implies, a series of host
government measures which when combined are expropiatory,
even though each individual measure taken alone might be
considered a proper exercise of the host government's
regulatory powers.
- War/revolution/civil disturbance. This
coverage usually embraces the removal, destruction or
physical damage of tangible assets of an investment project
and the substantial interference in the enterprise's
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business operations as a result of acts of war, revolution
or other organized political violence designed to overthrow
the host government. In accordance with common practice,
business interruption is normally confined to major
interferences in the projects enterprise's operations
persisting for at least one year.
In addition to these conventionally offered
coverage, MIGA also offer special breach of contract
protection. It encompasses losses resulting from any
repudiation or breach by an entity of the host government
of a contract with the insured party. In order to avoid
MIGA's involvement in the substance of investment disputes,
coverage is confined to three types of cases, The first is
where the guarantee holder cannot take its complaint to a
competent court or arbitral tribunal which is independent
from the executive branch, adheres to minimum standards of
due process and is empowered to make binding decisions on
the complaint. The second is where such decision is not
rendered within a reasonable period of time as is specified
in the insurance contract (to be not less than two years);
or the third case, where the guarantee holder cannot
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enforce an award in his favor within 90 days from
initiation of enforcement action or such other period as
may be specified in the individual guarantee contract. Any
of these three cases of denial of justice may entitle
guarantee holders to compensation, so that the guarantee in
fact covers both adequate recourse to obtain a final
decision in due course and the enforceability of such
decision.
The breach of contract coverage tends to be of
particular importance to investors under production- and
profit-sharing agreements or in "build, operate and
transfer" contracts. The latter are in essence variants of
turnkey contracts where a construction syndicate delivers a
plant (e.g., a power plant), retains ownership or it and
operates it for a specified period of time, after which it
transfers ownership to an agency of the host government.
In this example, the construction syndicate recoups its
investment from the sale of electricity under a specified
rate formula according to a sales contract, usually with a
state-owned utility company. Depending on the specifics of
the arrangement,
syndicate's rights
MIGA
under
may cover the
the sales contract.
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Premiums and Fees
MIGA is required to operate on a self-sustaining
basis. It must therefore charge premiums and fees which
adequately cover its administrative expenditures and
reasonably projected underwriting losses. It charges small
application fees, standby premiums for committed but
inactivated coverage, premiums for actual coverage, and
fees for special services rendered in conjunction with a
guarantee.
Unlike most national agencies and private
insurers, MIGA offers investors a choice between
individually priced coverage of particular types of risks
and coverage of risk packages comprising all types of
covered risks. As it is now devised, and subject to review
in light of actual experience, the premium rates for any
type of coverage (e.g., currency transfer, expropriation,
etc.) varies between 0.3 and 1.5 percent of the amount of
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guarantee per annum. Within this range, MIGA in each case
determines the actual premium rate in accordance with the
results of its risk assessment; it may also take into
account the impact of the proposed guarantee on its overall
risk portfolio and the premium rates of a potential
coinsurer and reinsurer.
Variable premium rates are the corollary to a
flexible underwriting concept. As noted before, MIGA
determines its premium rates between broad ranges on the
basis of the risk profile of each guarantee proposal and
other relevant factors. To ensure the objectivity and
consistency of premium rating, (a source of conflict in
such a politically heterogenous organization) MIGA's
president institutes administrative procedures that provide
for appraisals and recommendations by MIGA's underwriting
staff, review by senior management of staff
recommendations, and final decision by the President.
first
risk
To determine the rates for risk packages, MIGA
sets a rate within the above range for each type of
comprising the package and may then apply, at its
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option, a discount of up to 50 percent of the sum of the
individual rates. Although rates should be determined
solely by the project's and the host country risk
assessment, the inherent nature of the entity as a
developmental agency prompts this unique approach.
MIGA focuses its primary attention on the
particulars of each individual project (so called "project
underwriting"). This approach is designed to reflect
fairly the risk characteristics of the individual project
rather than those of the host country, and it may make it
possible for MIGA to cover good projects in economically
troubled countries, such as export-oriented or import
substitution projects in highly indebted countries.
MIGA, of course, also takes into account
investment conditions in the host country to the extent
that they may affect the vulnerability of a particular
investment to the specific risks against which coverage is
sought. The existence of a bilateral investment protection
treaty between the investor's country and the host country
is normally accepted as evidence of adequate legal
145
protection. Another important factor is the host country's
foreign exchange regime and reserves.
Future Expansion of the Insurance Program
According to MIGA's broad parameters set by the
Convention for its articles of incorporation, the initial
guarantee program can be further developed and expanded by
the Board of Directors. For example, cover could be
extended to additional forms of direct investment and long-
and medium-term loans to a project enterprise made by a
financial institution. By the same token, coverage might
be extended to additional types of non-commercial risk such
as terrorism or sabotage.
Companies planning an investment which does not
precisely fall within the ambit of MIGA's existing program
as is outlined here are encouraged to consult with MIGA
before assuming coverage is not available. It is key to
remember that MIGA is an investment incentive agency and
not a for-profit insurance corporation, and as such will,
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when and where appropriate, decide to extend or modify its
programs to cover an exceptional investment or risk.
With this we have analyzed potential suppliers of
political risk insurance, and covered in depth one program
offered by a natural candidate, a branch of the wealthy and
powerful multilateral agency: The World Bank. The fact
that to date this entity has not sold any coverage due to
the recent announcement of its programs make it too soon to
establish if such coverage, as proposed will be enough
incentive to bring Latin investors to repatriate their
assets. The key to answer of this question lies in
understanding the rationale and particular idiosyncrasies
of the Latin entrepreneur. It is my contention that the
decision process and criteria observed by Latin investors
following a strategy of country risk diversification is
grossly misunderstood by American policy makers. The next
chapter attempts to shed some light on this particular
subject drawing mainly from personal experience and
interviews with Latin American individuals in the positions
of corporate CEO or heads of families holding substantial
investment assets in the United States.
Chapter 4
Latin American Investment Abroad
Regarding Latin American investment abroad,
key issues that this chapter attempts to understand are
following:
- Which are the
in their own countries, as
risks investors perceive to face
compared to ones faced abroad.
- How was the investment strategy devised and how
often was it revised. And as corollary to this issue, what
has been the actual experience (returns) with investment
abroad, specially as compared to the returns the investors
were accustomed to at home.
- Would these
purchase political risk
investors be in the market to
insurance if it was available?
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the
the
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- Once insured, would investors bring flight
capital back? If not, why not?
As part of the process, all but one of the
interviews were recorded with the approval of the subjects.
In order to improve access to delicate information, I
personally committed to maintain the anonymity of my
subjects and to insure the confidentiality of the
information provided. Respecting that commitment, all
subjects are only identified by country of origin, and in
some cases I have chosen to disguise their industry, as not
doing so would have compromised this effort. Most of the
data from the interviews served also as supporting material
for the previous chapters.
Rationale
During the meetings with investors from El
Salvador I was informed of the existence of a specific
insurance program in El Salvador that was created under the
auspices of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The program provides protection to the investments of the
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private sector in certain strategic sectors of the
Salvadoran economy through insurance against damages due to
civil turmoil, malicious acts and terrorism.
The
(PROINVER being
beginnings based
nvestment Promotion
its spanish acronym),
on a fund provided as
U.S. AID; it used as a marketing
Insurance
had its
collatera
arm a consortium
System
if f icu l t
by the
of local
insurance companies and eventually sought Lloyds of London
to purchase reinsurance. I say difficult beginnings
because when the program was proposed, local insurers were
skeptical a large enough market existed and considered the
sale of this product a "hard" sell. This hard sell issue
pertains to the fact insurance protection costs doubled
expense levels maintained for regular hazard policies.
Irrelevant of the protection provided, this is a huge cost
hike for entities operating marginally in a region affected
by internal warfare.
Salvador
existing
Studying the results of this
is relevant for this thesis, as
program providing comprehensive
program in El
it is the only
insurance for
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managing the risk of terrorist and guerrilla caused work
stoppages and destruction of assets. Conclusions may be
drawn from the loss experience in El Salvador, and an
estimation can be made of the demand that exist for this
type of protection, and most importantly, establish if the
insurance is incentive enough for investors to stop drawing
their funds out of the country.
The PROINVER program has barely completed one
year of experience. The first year losses have been
moderate and FOINVER (AID's fund) has not suffered a
significant outflow. In fact, when interest income is
included, the loss of capital is minimal, while the impact
of the program on the psychology of the productive sector
and the ability of damaged industries to rebuild has been,
and continues to be quite important. The policy goals of
providing the productive sectors protection against
terrorist attacks has proven to be valuable and worth
pursuing. Nonetheless, the ultimate goal being studied by
'' Gudger, William Michael ( November 30, 1988) Report to
the Private Enterprise Bureau of USAID - El Salvador, for
the Investment Promotion Insurance Program.
this work,
achieved.
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protect an
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ertainty, that his business plans can
repreneur must assume the economy it
s not going to be subjected to huge
that may change his comparative
These events, loosely labeled
se the investor to demand higher
in order to adjust for the higher
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investor will
there was
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simply move some asse
This point
no demand
In fact,
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not be misunderstood to imply
the political risk insurance of
program quickly oversold its
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underwriting capacity, even though, insurance coverage has
been limited to 50% of the value covered under the fire
policy, and the government made it available mainly to
export oriented industries. (The exception was a small sub
program insuring the Salvadoran bus fleet).
At present, PROINVER's fund can be leveraged only
by the 15% deductible and the 10% retained by the local
Consorcio, giving the program a total capacity of 144
Colones (approximately U.S.$24 million). This is
undoubtedly a very small amount in the context of the
Salvadoran economy. It is likely that such severe
rationing will produce anti-selection; that is, the most
exposed industries will be insured first. This being the
case, losses could be quite high if the terrorist again
begin to attack the private industrial structure of the
country.
Thus, there is a market and there is a need. And
certainly, it is too soon to measure the impact on capital
investment this program will have in El Salvador. But my
guess is that, if any, it will only slow the rate of
capital f
succinctl
[due to
deplaning
insurance
light. The
y by saying
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company. 0
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investor expressed this view
I have to leave my country
I want to know that when
have to go and deal with an
will be safe in the bank."
This position was found
mainly when they reached another
diversification
investor
outside of
reached a
the famil
investor,
protection
until his
Such an
liability
process.
to differ
stage in t
For example,
among
heir
the
had just recently started creating a
Panama. As he put it, his family ha
critical mass of liquid asses abroad t
y in case they had to leave the count
irrelevant of the purchase of
will continue to pull moneys out
own "insurance" is formed at a bank
individual could not afford the
of not being able to collect on
investors
investment
Panamanian
nest egg
d not yet
o sustain
ry. This
insurance
of Panama
account.
contingent
his insurance due
to some small print technicality.
Note that until the recent events surrounding
Noriega administration, Panamanian investors generally
the
not
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participated in capital flight. This fact confirms the
premises that capital outflows occur mainly in countries
imposing severe exchange and transfer controls. Since
Panama uses the U.S. dollar a the only printed currency,
such controls are not practical. The U.S. presence in the
Canal Zone, which has historically insured the absence of
the most common political problems suffered by the rest of
Latin America, has given local and foreign investors a
sense of security. All these factors, coupled with the
strength of the financial community and the low taxation
structure, have contributed to make Panama an exception in
the region. Capital had nothing to "flee" from until now
that political risks have become a real threat to the
community.
On the other hand, both investors from El
Salvador had started this process over 25 years ago, and
had accomplished substantial success and financial security
in the United States. These investors had entered a
different stage of the game, participating in land banking,
stocks and bonds and other non passive forms of investment.
In their words, the most successful process followed had
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been, first to "park" funds abroad while they became
"acclimatized" with the investment environment. Second,
start joint ventures with local people having good track
records in their fields. Then, as this process developed
and the significance of the foreign portfolio increased,
they moved key family members abroad to get involved with
the direct management of these ventures.
For most, the process started by going into the
same businesses the owned at home. When doing so, the
prevailing result was that returns on investment in the
U.S. were lower than those obtained in their home
operations. In this regard, comparing on an industry to
industry basis, the case for investment insurance could be
made very well. The return differential would justify the
premium costs, the investor would secure higher returns at
home and political risk exposure would be protected by the
policy.
But, this was not the case for the most
sophisticated and experienced investors as their return on
investment in their foreign operations was greater than the
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one achieved in their host countries. Note this is not
comparing on an industry to industry basis, but over all.
For example, if the specific group operated a manufacturing
operation at home, the returns it provided were much lower
than the average return on investment in the U.S.. Returns
at home were not higher than what was being obtained
through joint ventures in land speculation and real estate
development in the U.S. As one can imagine, once that
stage is reached, no amount of insurance will ever entice
the return of capital investment to Latin America. The
opportunity cost would not justify it. The sheer size of
the U.S. market would provide unlimited development
potential, impossible to match in developing economies.
As a matter
way or another, their
local markets in a par
limitation of small
limited competition,
constrained. Local
their own creation of
financing locally.
of fact, most investors stated in one
concern over the saturation of their
ticular industry. This is a natural
developing countries, so even with
investment perspectives are
projects are expected to survive on
wealth and the ability to secure
When this fails, in a somewhat
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contradictory manner, capital has been repatriated. The
main cause being the lack of liquidity in the local system.
Crossed repatriation of capital has also been
effected by these sophisticated investors. In an effort to
diversify their country risk, and take advantage of know-
how in a particular industry and region, many have invested
in neighboring developing nations. In most cases, also
participating in local joint ventures as described before.
One common factor to all interviewed investors
was their need for secrecy and privacy. Categorically they
would not seek to purchase insurance if one requirement is
that their government be privy to their holdings abroad.
Even recognizing that real opportunities are being lost in
areas where the investors had personal expertise, the risk
of future repercussions would stop them from sharing any
information with the government. This attitude should
indicate to World Bank's MIGA that a change in its
insurance program will be required to make it successful.
Investors require
policy be totally secret.
with kidnapping insurance pr
the existence of the policy
abduction. Investors feel
exposure in areas not insur
financial information to t
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that the existence of the
the same way as it happens
ided by Lloyds, making public
mply increases the risk of an
ey would increase their own
, by exposing their private
ir government. It must be
none of these investors paid
tries for income generated
tax, where applicable, in the
vestments were kept). This
legal issue, as an investor
should be assessed retroactive taxes because local
legislation, the same as in the U.S., requires that
be paid on the individual's world income.
taxes
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Political risk insurance as such, is not the
solution to alleviate investor's concerns causing capital
flight. Acquiring protection to eliminate that one risk
does not change the main sources of concern. These are
mainly the serious commercial risks caused by the major
macro economic swings suffered by the local economies. The
lack of adequate infrastructures which, coupled with many
forms of direct or indirect government intervention,
threaten the security of the investment and hurt the
profitability for the entrepreneur.
Insurance would contribute to alleviate some of
these concerns, bringing some capital investment back, and
cause a decrease in the volume of the outflows. But to be
achieve its intended results and be attractive to all
potential buyers, this insurance must be made available to
every type of industry and with no strings attached. The
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carrier must commit to long term coverage, and not require
the special previous approval of the host government. The
government itself should not know which entities are
insured and which are not, forcing an unbiased equal
treatment of all players.
Only capital investment will create the wealth to
improve the living conditions of the population. If
capital flight is to be reversed to attract it, the only
solution is that the countries create an environment that
truly welcomes investment, and allows it to flourish.
Paying lip service to this principle is not enough. The
investor must know that it can trust the stability of the
government and the honesty of its bureaucrats. That when
something fails, the system will have the adequate checks
and balances to adopt the needed solutions. Failure to
achieve this places the LDCs at a major disadvantage in
attracting capital vis a vis the developed nations.
Insurance should be considered only as protection
for uncontrollable fortuitus events. Just as regular
hazard insurance protects a family from catastrophic events
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but is never a substitute for a safety program, in the same
way, selling protection should not replace attacking the
roots of the problem. Programs like the one presented by
MIGA must be developed in conjunction with the consistent
advise to the governments of the LDCs to implement the
proper policies to attract and retain foreign and local
capital.
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Appendix 1
List of Interviewed Subjects
1.- Richard Stern
Vice President & General Counsel
Citicorp International Trade Indemnity, Inc.
New Jersey
2.- Victor Meneses
Senior Corporate Officer
Latin America and Africa
Citibank. N.A.
New York
3.- Gonzalo de las Heras
Senior Vice President
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
New York
4.- Byron M. Shoulton
Economist
Foreign credit Insurance Association
New York
5.- John H.B. Harriman
Senior Vice President
First Interstate Trading
Miami
6.- Harry Hood Bassett, Jr.
President and Chief Executive Officer
Bank Espirito Santo
Miami
7.- Walter Bastian
Director Caribbean Basin Division
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C.
James Todd
Economic Advisor
U.S. Mission
Organization of American States
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.
James C. Suma
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.
Charles A. Leik
Deputy Vice President
Export-Import Bank of the United States
Washington, D.C.
Jose Alberto Oribe
Counselor
Embassy of Guatemala
Washington, D.C.
Rodolfo Rohrmosser
Ambassador
Embassy of Guatemala
Washington, D.C.
Donna M. DiPaolo
Office of Regional
for Latin America
U.S. Department of
Washington, D.C.
Economic Policy
State
Faustino A. Perera
International Economics Division
Office of Trade and Investment Analysis
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C.
8.-
9.-
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10.-
11.-
12.-
13.-
14.-
John W. Gurr
Senior Insurance Officer, Latin America
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Washington, D.C.
Luisa D. Cerar
Director
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Economic Development Administration
Washington, D.C.
Felix Pena
Sub Gerente de Integracion
Departamento de Desarrollo Economico
Inter-American Development Bank
Washington, D.C.
Mark Le G. All
Division Chief
International
International
Washington, D.
y Social
Capital Markets
Monetary Fund
Kyung-Mo Huh
Senior Economist
Exchange and Trade Relations
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C.
Department
Gunther H. Muller
Gerente General
Corporacion Interamericana de Inversiones
Washington, D.C.
Christophe S. Bellinger
Guarantee Officer
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
The World Bank
Washington, D.C.
15.-
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16.-
17.-
18.-
19.-
20.-
21.-
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Miguel Urrutia
Interamerican Development Bank
Washington. D.C.
Roger Lacayo
Nicaraguan Entrepreneur
Refugee in Miami
Sergio Garcia-Granados
Senior Vice President & Financial Consultant
Shearson Lehman Hutton
New York
Carlos Escobar
Vice President & Financial Consultant
Merry l 1 Lynch
Miami
Investor 30.- Investor
Peru Honduras
Investor 31.- Investor
Ecuador Chile
Investor 1 32.- Investor
El Salvador Panama
Investor 2 33.- Investor
El Salvador Guatemala
22.-
23.-
24.-
25.-
26.-
27.-
28.-
29.-
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Appendix 2
Questionnaires Used
A verbal explanation was given to each subject of
an interview, regarding the concept of providing political
risk insurance to Latin American investors in their own
countries. For the ones that requested it, the following
text accompanied their questionnaire:
INVESTMENT INSURANCE FOR POLITICAL RISKS IN LATIN AMERICA
The absence of growth in the economies of Latin
American nations is due in great part to the lack of
capital investment. Capital flies out of the region when
faced with the perspective of confronting unbearable risks
as chronic currency devaluations, nationalizations,
exchange controls, and general political instability.
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If these risks could be insured by a carrier with
long term commitments and adequate financial backing, Latin
savings abroad could be lured back to the region. The
impact of drawing massive sustained investment into Latin
America would bring about increased per capita income,
growth of GNP, increased exports and foreign currency
reserves, and eventually stable economies providing the
basis for widespread prosperity in the region.
The purpose of this thesis is to establish the
feasibility and long term benefits of providing such
insurance to any interested party. Special emphasis will
be given in the analysis to the Caribbean and Central
American countries. as a program such as this one could be
an extension to the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
OPIC's through its foreign investment insurance
programs has many restrictions to provide insurance
coverage in Latin America. The fact only U.S. citizens (or
U.S. corporations owned by U.S. nationals) are eligible for
coverage, coupled investor's lack of knowledge of these
programs
from the
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and their lack of "know home" has kept them away
region.
If such insurance program
interested party willing to pay for
probably receive the attention of
"nest egg" savings outside their own
wou
fol
was available to any
its coverage, it would
Latin Americans with
countries.
Sources of information for this research project
include direct interviews with officers of the
wing entities:
- Foreign Commerce Insurance Association
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- International Monetary Fund
- Private Bankers in Florida
- Caribbean Basin Initiative's office
- Ministers of Economy and Finance of Latin Countries
- Private Export Funding Corporation
- Eximbank
- Individual Latin investors with deposits abroad
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Following, please find samples of the questionnaires:
Questions for U.S. Bankers:
1.) Do you think
risk insurance to
countries?
it would be feasible to offer
latin american investors in
pol itical
their own
2.) Do
effects
U.S.A.?
you think such
on the size of
coverage would
latin american
have any adverse
deposits in the
a.) Would you loose any business because of it?
b.) Would offering this
adverse effects on
insurance coverage have any
the U.S. economy as a whole?
Would increased capital investment in latin america
any effect in those countries' ability to pay their
gn debt?
3.)
have
forei
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a.) If so, would you support such a scheme if proposed
by the U.S. Government?
b.) In case of claims, the insuring entity would have
ultimate recourse with the government of the
country in question. What type of institution do
you think, would have a comparative advantage
(leverage) to effect such a claim to the host
government?
4.) In order to make insurance viable, the insurer might
require senior claims on the country's assets. This would
imply banks would have to become subordinated creditors.
Would U.S. Banks accept to subordinate their debt?
5.) Given bank's asymmetry in power (and their deep
involvement with the region), as compared with insurance
companies, would they be interested in providing country
risk insurance? Can you legally do so?
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Questions for Insurance Company Executives
1.) Would you consider such insurance desirable?
2.) Describe any potential conflicts of interest for
bankers, in as much such scheme would repatriate Latin
American deposits now in the U.S.?
3.) If political risk insurance were offered,
factor by itself be enough to cause a of
American deposits from U.S. Banks (or $
investments) back to their home countries?
would that
shift Latin
denominated
a.) Can you estimate demand?
4.) Do you think such insurance
feasible for private enterprise? If
could provide coverage?
would be
not, who
economically
do you think
an insurance company, are you willing to accept any
risk?
5.) As
country
6.) In case of claims,
ultimate recourse with
question. What type
comparative advantage (
the host government?
the insurance carr
the government of
of institution
leverage) to effect
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ier would have
the country in
would have a
such a claim to
7.) Would you (as an insurer and/or a u.S. Taxpayer) be
against such coverage be offered by:
a.) Private entities
b.) The U.S. Government
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Questions for Latin American Investors:
Latin American entrepreneurial able groups
are not investing in their home countries as much as their
businesses demand due to the high political and economic
risks involved. This questionnaire seeks to understand the
rationale and decision process faced by these individuals.
There has been very little research performed in this area,
and it is the contention of the writer, that the process is
grossly misunderstood abroad.
major area of
one of the sol
region. This
reactions as
statements.
Political risk insurance,
investor's concern, has
utions to attract capital
questionnaire also seeks
an investor in the
by alleviating one
been considered as
flows back into the
to understand your
region, to these
0.) Describe the nature of the risks you face in your
country of origin? (Please define risks separating pure
sovereign risks from commercial ones.)
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a.) Could you identify unusual political or economical
risks that are unique to your investment
environment?
Would you be interested in such coverage?
ne or estimate demand?
Can you
a.) If such insurance was
additional investment
b.) Would it change the ty
(I.E., From short rang
capital intensive to
c.) Who would take
(Foreigners or
offered, would it bring
(new capital) to the region?
pe of your investments?
e to long range, from
labor intensive).
advantage of this type of coverage?
locals, and why?)
2.) How much would you be willing to pay for
Expressed as a % of the insured portfolio, for
would a reasonable rate be?
coverage?
you, what
1.)
imagi
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a.) Since investments, specially in capital intensive
industries, have medium or long term pay-back
periods, what commitments would you require
regarding the duration of your coverage, in order
to returning any investment capital?
b.) What deductible would you consider acceptable?
3.) What entity would you expect be willing to give such a
coverage? What level of skepticism would you have to these
parties honoring such coverage agreements
a.) International insurance companies
b.) Foreign banks
c.) U.S. Govt. Or similar international entity
d.) Multilateral organizations such as World Bank,
Interamerican Development Bank, etc.
4.) Given the availability of this type of coverage, would
you be willing to shift back any of your deposits or U.S.$
Denominated assets, to your home country? Why?
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a.) Is there any difference between the return on
investment you are obtaining, from your investment
portfolio abroad with the one in your home
country? What is the return on equity on each of
the major types of investments you own?
b.) What percent of your assets are held abroad? Do
you have a specific target? (The purpose here is
to identify how over-exposed are local investors
to country risks.)
c.) Is there a fixed percentage of profits that are
moved out of the country every year to diversify
investment portfolio, or is there a certain amount
kept out regardless? How do you set these goals?
d.) Please explain the rationale for your group OR
family's investment policy. What is the
strategy? Who decides? How do you choose the
investment instruments? How did you choose the
country where you maintain your assets?
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e.) The media views your investments abroad as capital
flight and not as portfolio diversification, as
would be the case for an American investing
abroad. What are your views on this matter?
5.) Referring to your country of origin, please answer the
following:
a.) Is there a problem of lack of capital investment?
Is there a need for additional investment?
b.) What would be the effects of channeling additional
investment in to your country? What amounts would
be needed to make a difference?
c.) How do you expect your home country's government
to view this proposal? If it counts with official
support, do you think it is possible to secure
guarantees to be offered to the entity providing
insurance to entice them to provide such a
service?
d.) Can you create an
of investment in
6.) How
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insurance solution to the lack
Latin America?
often do you revise your investment strategy?
sensitive is your investment allocation
criteria to local:
process or
Political events
Economic conditions (ie. depressions, inflation)
Interest rate differentials
8.) In t
you have
attemptin
experienc
strategie
he future do you see any changes
made investment decisions.
g to establish if given pr
e and results; have you con
s for the future?
regarding the way
The question is
evious investment
sidered different
9.) If your company went through a crisis in your home
country, would you return any portion or all of your $
denominated assets in order to resolve it?
7.)
deci
How
sion
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10.) When borrowing abroad or in your country, have you or
would you consider in the future offering crossed
guarantees, pledging domestic or foreign assets as
collateral?
11.) Do you think latin america faces also a flight of
talent due to lack of challenging local opportunities?
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Appendix 3
Sample Insurance Policies
Policy Number:
Form : EXPRO-TI (1/88)
EXPROPRIATION INSURANCE
between
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
("CITI")
and
(the "Insured")
DECLARATIONS
For purposes of this policy, the terms below are defined as follows:
1. Policy Period:
2. Host Country:
3. Enterprise:
4. Investment:
5. Policy Currency:
6. Insured Percentage:
7. Premium:
8. Maximum Liability:
9. Endorsements:
By acceptance of this policy the Insured agrees that all statements
contained in the Application and the above Declarations and all written
statements submitted by the Insured or its agents are the Insured's
representations and agreements and that this policy, which includes any
endorsements, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
concerning the subject matter and supersedes any prior agreement or
understanding.
Agreed and Accepted By CITI
Title :
Date :
Form: EXPRO-TI (1/88)
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
EXPROPRIATION INSURANCE
Peril Insured
in consideration of the Premium paid by the Insured and subject
to the terms and conditions set forth below, CITI hereby agrees
to compensate the Insured for the Insured Percentage of loss
occurring during the Policy Period resulting solely and directly
from Expropriation. "Expropriation" means any act or series of
acts constituting expropriation, confiscation, nationalization or
requisition by the Host Government which for a period of nine
months substantially and directly:
1. Deprivation of Rights of Investor
Deprives the investor of rights In all or a specific portion
of the insured Investment which rights are necessary to
substantially realize the benefits of the insured
Investment; or
2. Taking of Enterprise Assets
Deprives the Enterprise of all or a portion of its assets;
or
3. Cessation of Operations
Deprives the Enterprise of fundamental rights, thereby
ultimately necessitating the cessation of operations.
"Host Governmenr means the central governmental authority of the
Host Country, or portion of the Host Country in which the
Enterprise is located, exercising effective legislative,
executive and judicial control, whether dl jure or dS facto.
II. Exclusions
CITI shall not be liable for any loss caused by or arising from:
1. War
Destruction or physical damage directly or indirectly
occasioned by, happening through or in consequence of war,
invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war
be declared or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution,
insurrection, military or usurped power.
2. Commercial Failure or Insolvency
The Insured's or the Enterprise's commercial failure,
insolvency or default on any financial obligation.
3. Malfeasance by Insured
Wrongful, dishonest or criminal acts or omissions by the
Insured or the Enterprise or agents of either.
4. Non-Compliance with Host Country Laws
Failure of the Insured or the Enterprise to comply with all
legal requirements of the Host Country and any other
governing authority, Including failure to obtain necessary
licenses and permits.
5. Nontransfer of Currency
Exchange control measures or delays In currency conversion
or transfer.
6. Breach of Policy
Material breach of any representation, condition, warranty
or covenant of the Insured contained In this policy.
Ill. Compensation
1. Total Loss
In the case of total loss, the compensation payable shall be
the Insured Percentage times
(a) the principal and accrued interest of any debt
Investment covered, plus(b) the net book value of the equity Investment
covered, translated into Policy Currency,
as of the date the expropriatory effect commences. The net
book value shall be computed In accordance with principles
of accounting generally accepted in the domicile country of
the Insured and used by the Insured. Adjustments shall be
made to account for the Enterprise as an independent entity,
and to reflect the standard of arm's-length dealing between
related parties and reductions in realizable values.
2. Partial Loss
in the case of a partial loss, the compensation payable
shall be the Insured Percentage times the net book value of(1) the portion of the Insured's Investment taken or (2) its
prg rata equity interest In the assets taken. In no case
shall the compensation payable for any loss computed under
this section 2 exceed the compensation which would be
payable for a total loss under section 1 on the date the
expropriatory effect commences.
3. Date of Loss Computation
Compensation shall be computed as of the date the
expropriatory effect commences. Where the Expropriation
consists of a series of acts, the loss date is the date when
the cumulative effect of the acts constitutes Expropriation,
thereby commencing the Waiting Period. Compensation shall
be Increased, however, to take Into account reductions in
net book value directly caused by such expropriatory acts
occurring prior to the loss date, but not to exceed the
Maximum Liability.
B64
4. Insolvency
If Enterprise liabilities exceed assets as of the date the
Expropriation occurs, compensation shall not exceed the
insured Percentage times the amount the Insured would have
been entitled to receive had the Enterprise been liquidated
at book value.
5. Salvage
Compensation shall be reduced by the insured Percentage of
any other compensation, offset or salvage realized by the
insured outside the Host Country with respect to the
Expropriation. Any amounts of salvage realized by CITI with
respect to a compensated Expropriation shall be applied
first to reimburse CITI for its out-of-pocket expenses in
pursuing salvage and shall then be divided between the
parties according to the Insured Percentage ratio. However,
to the extent CITi's net recovery exceeds the amount CITI
paid plus its out-of-pocket expenses, the insured shall be
paid a portion of the excess determined by dividing the time
period between the date of the loss event and the date of
claim payment by the time period between the date of the
loss event and the date the excess is recovered.
6. Maximum Liability
Under no circumstances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate
under this policy for more than the amount of Maximum
Liability set forth in the Declarations.
7. De Minimis Claims
CITI shall not be liable for any Expropriation if the amount
of compensation payable would be less than United States$20,000.
IV. Conditions
1. Notice of Potential Claim
The Insured shall notify CITI promptly, and in no event in
more than 30 days, of any occurrence which could give rise
to a claim.
2. Cooperation
The Insured shall take all reasonable steps to avoid or
minimize loss. The Insured shall cooperate fully and cause
any person or entity within its power to cooperate fully
with CITI in the investigation of any claim, the resolution
of any potential claim situation and the pursuit of any
claim salvage. Such cooperation shall include disclosure of
records and documents and the making available of
witnesses. Prior to any claim payment, the Insured shall
pursue and cause the Enterprise to pursue all reasonable
legal, administrative, judicial and informal means of
avoiding or remedying any Expropriation which would be
compensable under this policy. Neither the Insured nor the
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Enterprise shall enter into any agreement concerning a loss
or potential loss without CITI's prior written consent.
3. Burden of Proof
The Insured shall have the burden of proof In establishing
its right to any compensations under this policy. Any claim
for compensation shall be submitted within 6 months of the
expiration of the Waiting Period following the event of loss
and if withdrawn may not be resubmitted.
4. Assignment and Subrogation
As a condition to any claim payment, the Insured shall
assign to CITI all of the Insured's right, title and
interest in the Investment and assets taken and all related
claims against third parties. Should CITI so request, the
Insured shall retain legal title to any interests or claims
to which CITI is entitled. CITI shall have no obligation to
pursue salvage with respect to any claim. Any salvage
received by the Insured shall be considered held in trust
for CITI and transferred to CITI for apportionment in
accordance with Article l1l, section 5.
V. Warranties
The Insured warrants and agrees that:
1. Accuracy of Representations
All written statements submitted to CITI to obtain this
policy are true and correct and no material information has
been withheld. Should there be any material inaccuracy in
the Insured's representations, CITI may void this policy,
retain the premium paid and refuse to compensate the Insured
for loss occurring prior to the discovery of the material
misrepresentation.
2. Preservation of Remedies
The Insured will preserve and cause the Enterprise to
preserve all legal, judicial and administrative remedies
applicable to any Expropriation and furnish reasonable
assistance in maintaining any rights or property transferred
to CITI.
3. Confidentiality
The Insured will not disclose the existence of this policy
to any third party without CITI's prior consent except in
confidence to the Insured's broker and banker.
4. Self-Insured Retention
The Insured will remain at risk for any loss resulting from
the peril insured by this policy to the extent of at least
100 percent less the Insured Percentage times the net book
value of its equity and debt interest in the Enterprise.
VI. General Provisions
1. Declarations
The Declarations and the Application are an integral part of
this policy. For purposes of this policy, the terms defined
in the Declarations shall have the meanings set forth
therein.
2. Cancellation
This policy may not be cancelled by either party, except
that CITI may cancel for nonpayment of premium upon ten days
written notice to the Insured. In such case, this policy
shall be void _2 initio and no claim shall be compensable,
whether arising before or after the due date of the Premium.
3. Non-Assignment
The Insured shall not assign or transfer this policy or the
benefits or obligations thereof to any other party or
person, except with CITI's prior consent. The Insured may,
with CITI's prior agreement, require any payments hereunder
to be made to a named loss payee, all the Insured's
obligations under this policy remaining unaffected.
4. Other Insurance
The insurance provided under this policy shall be excess
over any other insurance or indemnity covering the same
event of loss.
5. Notice and Modification
All notices under this policy shall be in writing and
delivered to responsible officers of the parties at the
addresses indicated in the Declarations. This policy may be
modified only by written, mutual consent of the parties.
6. Governing Law
This policy shall be governed by the laws of New York.
7. Arbitration
Any controversy relating to this policy shall be settled by
arbitration in New York, New York according to the then
prevailing Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Unless the Insured initiates
arbitration, CITI's liability with respect to any claim
matter shall expire one year after CITI notifies the Insured
of CITI's determination concerning an application for
compensation. A decision by an arbitrator or arbitral panel
shall be final and binding, subject to the Maximum Liability
limit.
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CURRENCY NONTRANSFER
INSURANCE FOR INVESTORS
between
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675(CITI")
and
(the "Insured")
DECLARATIONS
For purposes of this policy, the terms below are defined as follows:
1. Policy Period:
2. Host Country:
3. Enterprise:
4. Investment:
5. Policy Currency:
6. Insured Percentage:
7. Premium:
8. Maximum Liability:
9. Waiting Period:
10. Endorsements:
By acceptance of this policy the Insured agrees that all statements
contained In the Application and the above Declarations and all written
statements submitted by the Insured or its agents are the Insured's
representations and agreements and that this policy, which includes any
endorsements, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
concerning the subject matter and supersedes any prior agreement or
understanding.
Agreed and Accepted By CITI
Title:
Date : 0--ek C&
Form
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675
CURRENCY NONTRANSFER
INSURANCE FOR INVESTORS
Peril Insured
In consideration of the Premium paid by the Insured and subject to the
terms and conditions set forth below, CITI hereby agrees to compensate
the insured for the Insured Percentage of any loss occurring during
the Policy Period resulting solely and directly from a condition of
Nontransfer remaining In effect continuously for the Waiting Period.
"Nontransfer" shall mean inability of the Enterprise and/or Insured,
after all reasonable efforts, to convert and transfer outside the Host
Country available funds through any normal currency exchange channel
to remit In Policy Currency a distribution of earnings from or
repatriation of the insured Investment.
The loss shall be deemed to occur and the Waiting Period commence with
the first attempt by the Enterprise and/or Insured to transfer the
funds in question.
II. Exclusions
CITI shall not be liable for any loss caused by or arising from:
1. Pre-existing Restrictions
Pre-existing restrictions on transfer such that the Enterprise
and/or Insured would have been unable to transfer legally a
similar distribution in comparable circumstances as of the
commencement of the Policy Period or as of the date of any
subsequent extension or renewal.
2. Internal Freezes
Restrictions on usage of the funds within the Host Country.
3. Nonperformance by Insured
Material failure by the Insured and/or Enterprise to perform any
reasonable legal requirement necessary to convert and transfer
the funds or to make all reasonable efforts to effect transfer
through all direct and indirect legal means.
4. Malfeasance by Insured
Wrongful, dishonest or criminal acts or omissions by the Insured
or its agents.
5. Insolvency or Financial Default
insolvency, bankruptcy or financial default of any party except
the official exchange control authority of the Host Country.
SPECIMEN
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6. Currency Fluctuation
Currency fluctuation or devaluation.
7. Delays by Insured
Failure by the Insured to attempt the transfer, or take
reasonable steps to cause the Enterprise to effect the transfer,
of the funds from the Host Country within thirty days of the
earliest date that the funds were available for transfer.
8. Breach of Policy
Material breach of any representation, condition, warranty or
covenant of the Insured contained in this policy.
9. War
Declared or undeclared war (whether before or after the outbreak
of hostilities) between any of China, France, Great Britain, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America or between the Host Country and the Insured's Country.
Ill. Compensation
1. Basis of Compensation
Compensation shall be the Insured Percentage times the Policy
Currency equivalent of the currency of the Host Country sought to
be transferred as of the end of the Waiting Period. The
equivalent value shall be determined by applying the net exchange
rate prevailing in the normal exchange market or channel through
which Policy Currency Is generally available for the type of
transaction involved.
2. Other Compensation
With respect to any event of loss, compensation shall be reduced
by the Insured Percentage of the amount of any other compensation
or monetary benefit realized by the Insured by reason of the
event.
3. Currency of Payment
All compensation shall be computed and paid In Policy Currency.
4. Salvage
Any amounts of salvage realized by CITI with respect to a compen-
sated claim shall be applied first to reimburse CITI for its out-
of-pocket expenses in pursuing salvage and shall then be divided
between the parties according to the Insured Percentage ratio.
However, to the extent CITI's net recovery exceeds the amount
CITI paid plus its out-of-pocket expenses, the Insured shall be
paid a portion of the excess determined by dividing the time
period between the date of the loss event and the date of claim
payment by the time period between the date of the loss event and
the date the excess Is recovered.
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5. Maximum Liability LImits
Under no circumstances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate
under this policy for more than the amount of Maximum Liability
set forth In the Declarations. In the event that CITI has issued
an expropriation policy covering the insured Investment, under no
circumstances shall CITI be liable In the aggregate under both
policies combined for an amount In excess of the higher of the
two Maximum Liabilities set forth In Declarations of the
policies.
IV. Conditions
1. Notice of Potential Claim
The Insured shall notify CITI promptly, and in no event in more
than 30 days, of any occurrence which could give rise to a
claim. Notwithstanding any other provision of this policy, if an
event of loss occurs, CITI may terminate the Waiting Period and
demand a claim filing and an assignment and subrogation, in
accordance with section 4 of this Article, within ten working
days as a pre-condition to any claim payment.
2. Cooperation
The Insured shall take all reasonable steps to avoid or minimize
loss. Should a claim or potential claim situation arise, such
steps shall include taking all reasonable steps to effect
transfer of the funds through any legal means. The insured shall
cooperate fully and cause any person or entity within Its power
to cooperate fully with CITI In the investigation of any claim,
the resolution of any potential claim situation and the pursuit
of any claim salvage. Such cooperation shall Include disclosure
of records and documents and the making available of witnesses.
Prior to any claim payment, the Insured will pursue all
reasonable legal, administrative, judicial and informal means of
avoiding or remedying any event of loss which would be
compensable under this policy. The Insured shall not enter into
any agreement concerning a loss or potential loss without CITI's
prior written consent.
3. Burden of Proof
The Insured shall have the burden of proof in establishing Its
right to any compensation under this policy. Any claim for
compensation shall be submitted within three months of the
expiration of the Waiting Period following the event of loss and
if withdrawn may not be resubmitted.
4. Assignment and Subrogation
As a condition to any claim payment, the insured shall assign to
CITI all of the insured's right, title and Interest in the
currency which is the subject of the claim and all related claims
against third parties and, unless illegal, deliver the funds to
CITI In the Host Country. Should CITI so request, the Insured
shall retain legal title to any interests or claims to which CITI
Is entitled. Any salvage received by the Insured shall be
considered held in trust for CITI and transferred to CITI for
apportionment in accordance with Article IlIl, section 4.
V. Warranties
The Insured warrants and agrees that:
1. Accuracy of Representations
All written statements submitted to CITI to obtain this policy
are true and correct and no material Information has been
withheld. Should there be any material inaccuracy in the
Insured's representations, CITI may void this policy, retain the
premium paid and refuse to compensate the Insured for loss
occurring prior to the discovery of the material
misrepresentation.
2. Current Exchange Control Regime
As of the commencement of the Policy Period and as of the date of
any subsequent extension or renewal, the Insured Is not aware of
and has no reason to be aware of any significant delays in the
types of currency transfers which are the subject of this policy
or any restriction imposed under the laws, regulations, orders or
decrees of the Host Country or under any voluntary agreement
which would impair or significantly delay such transfers except
as specifically disclosed in the Application.
3. Preservation of Remedies
The Insured will preserve all legal, Judicial and administrative
remedies applicable to any claim and furnish reasonable
assistance in maintaining any rights or property transferred to
CITI.
4. Confidentiality
The Insured will not disclose the existence of this policy to any
third party without CITI's prior consent except in confidence to
the Insured's broker and banker.
5. Self-Insured Retention
The insured will remain at risk for any loss resulting from the
perils covered to the extent not insured by this policy.
VI. General Provisions
1. Declarations
The Declarations and the Application are an integral part of this
policy. For purposes of this policy, the terms defined in the
Declarations shall have the meanings set forth therein.
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2. Exchange Rates
Any computation of currency equivalents required by this policy
shall utilize the method set forth in Article l1l, section 1.
3. Cancellation
This policy may not be cancelled by either party, except that
CITI may cancel for nonpayment of Pre mium upon twenty days
written notice to the Insured. In such case, this policy shall
be void gi Initio and no claim shall be compensable, whether
arising before or after the due date of the Premium.
4. Non-Assignment
The insured shall not assign or transfer this policy or the
benefits or obligations thereof to any other party or person,
except with CITI's prior consent. The Insured may, with CITI's
prior agreement, require any payments hereunder to be made to a
named loss payee, all the Insured's obligations under this policy
remaining unaffected.
5. Other Insurance
The insurance provided under this policy shall be excess over any
other insurance or indemnity covering the same event of loss.
6. Notice and Modification
All notices under this policy shall be in writing and delivered
to responsible officers of the parties at the addresses indicated
in the Declarations. This policy may be modified only by
written, mutual consent of the parties.
7. Governing Law
This policy shall be governed by the laws of New York state.
8. Arbitration
Any dispute relating to this policy shall be settled by
arbitration in New York, New York according to the then
prevailing Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Unless the Insured initiates
arbitration, CITI's liability with respect to any claim matter
shall expire one year after CITI notifies the Insured of CITI's
determination concerning an application for compensation. A
decision by an arbitrator or arbitral panel shall be final and
binding, subject to the Maximum Liability limit.
lj3
CITCORPOINSURANCE Policy Number :Form : EX 4/87
CONTRACT FRUSTRATION INSURANCE
FOR EXPORTERS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
between
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675("CIT")
and
(the "Insured")
DECLARATIONS
For purposes of this policy, the terms below are defined as follows:
1. Policy Period:
2. Buyer:
3. Guarantor:
4. Buyer's Country:
5. Insured's Country:
6. Contract:
7. Policy Currency:
8. Insured Percentage:
9. Maximum Liability:
10. Coverages Elected:
11. Waiting Period:
12. Premium:
13. Endorsements:
The Buyer is a Buyer.
which
has guaranteed the obligations of the Buyer.
subject to any Per Period Liability limits
added by endorsement.
Perils covered in Art 1.1 & 5: days
Perils covered in Art 1.2,3 & 4: dys
By acceptance of this policy
contained in the Application a
statements submitted by the
representations and agreements
endorsements, constitutes the
concerning the subject matter
understanding.
the Insured agrees that all statements
nd the above Declarations and all written
insured or Its agents are the Insured's
and that this policy, which includes any
entire agreement between the parties
and supersedes any prior agreement or
Agreed and Accepted By CITI
This: FL. hTitle:
Date:
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CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675
CONTRACT FRUSTRATION INSURANCE
FOR EXPORTERS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
Perils Insured
In consideration of the Premium paid by the Insured and subject
to the terms and conditions set forth below, CITI hereby agrees
to compensate the Insured for the Insured Percentage of loss
occurring during the Policy Period resulting solely and directlyfrom any of the following perils remaining in effect continuously
for the Waiting Period:
1. Public Buyer Repudiation or Non-Payment
The unjustified repudiation of the Contract or failure to
make any payment due under the Contract by the Public Buyer
and any Guarantor or the material failure by the Public
Buyer and any Guarantor to perform any obligation under the
Contract where such failure renders it commercially
impractical or impossible for the Insured to perform its
obligations under the Contract. Failure to perform includes
failure by the Public Buyer and any Guarantor to honor ajudgment or arbitral award based upon a repudiation or
failure to perform under the Contract during the Policy
Period; such event of loss shall be considered to occur
during the Policy Period.
2. Buyer's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation
having the force of law in the Buyer's Country, including
cancellation of a valid import license, which directly
prevents further performance of the Contract and is outside
the control of the Insured.
3. Insured's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation
having the force of law in the Insured's Country, including
cancellation of a valid export license, which directly
prevents further performance of the Contract and is outside
the control of the Insured.
4. War
A state of war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or
revolution in the Buyer's Country which directly prevents
performance of the Contract for at least six months, thereby
causing termination of the Contract.
5. Nontransfer of Currency
Inability of the Buyer and/or Insured, after all reasonable
efforts, to effect the transfer of funds outside the Buyer's
Country through any normal currency exchange channel, if
such transfer is necessary
a. for the Buyer to satisfy a Policy Currency obligation
to the Insured under the Contract, or
b. for the Insured to repatriate the proceeds of the sale
of equipment or materials in the Buyer's Country which
the Insured is legally entitled to convert and
repatriate under the terms of the Contract and local
law.
Only after delivery to CITI of the nontransferable currency
shall any compensation be payable.
Exclusions
CITI shall not be liable for any loss caused by or arising from:
1. Nonperformance by Insured
Material failure by the Insured to perform any obligation
under the Contract or to comply with the terms of any export
or import license or other legal requirement.
2. Malfeasance by Insured
Wrongful, dishonest or criminal acts or omissions by the
Insured or its agents.
3. Insolvency or Financial Default
Insolvency, bankruptcy or financial default of any party
except a Public Buyer or the official exchange control
authority of the Buyer's Country.
4. Currency Fluctuation
Currency fluctuation or devaluation.
5. Delays by Insured
Failure by the Insured to attempt the transfer, or take
reasonable steps to cause the Buyer to effect the transfer,
of any funds from the Buyer's Country within thirty days of
the earliest date that the funds were available for
transfer.
6. Disputes
Any material dispute under the Contract which has not been
finally adjudicated or settled except to the extent that the
Buyer's position Is demonstrably without merit or any final
award or judgment in favor of the Buyer is demonstrably
unjust.
Hc(.0
7. Breach of Policy
Material breach of any representation, condition, warranty
or covenant of the Insured contained in this policy.
8. War
Declared or undeclared war (whether before or after the out-
break of hostilities) between any of China, France, Great
Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America or between the Buyer's Country and
the Insured's Country.
9. Physical Damage
Physical damage, including ionizing radiation or contami-
nation by radioactivity from any nuclear fuel or from any
nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel or the
radioactive toxic, explosive or hazardous properties of any
nuclear assembly or nuclear component thereof.
Compensation
1. Basis of Compensation
a. Repudiation, Non-Payment, Frustration, War
For loss by reason of a peril specified in sections 1,
2, 3 or 4 of Article I, compensation shall be the
Insured Percentage times the amount of
(i) Post Delivery
legally enforceable debt due the Insured under the
Contract for services performed and goods
delivered and
(ii) Pre-Delivery
necessary costs and expenses incurred by the
Insured directly related to performance of the
Contract which have not been paid for by the Buyer
or compensated under (i), plus a deemed profit
factor of ten percent of such costs and expenses,
as of the occurrence of the event of loss, less
(x) any valid credit, off-set or counter-claim
available to the Insured and
(y) any costs or expenses saved by the Insured by
reason of premature termination or suspension of
its performance under the Contract.
b. Nontransfer of Currency
For loss by reason of the peril specified in section 5
of Article 1, compensation shall be the Insured
Percentage times the Policy Currency equivalent of the
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currency of the Buyer's Country sought to be trans-
ferred as of the later of (1) the due date of the
obligation or (2) the date the currency of the Buyer's
Country Is deposited for transfer. The equivalent
value shall be determined by applying the net exchange
rate prevailing in the normal exchange market or
channel through which Policy Currency is generally
available for the type of transaction Involved.
2. Fines and Penalties
In no event shall compensation include any amount for
governmental fines, duties or taxes or Contract penalties,
including penalties for delay or nonperformance.
3. Other Compensation
With respect to any event of loss, compensation shall be
reduced by the Insured Percentage of the amount of any other
compensation or monetary benefit realized by the Insured by
reason of the event.
4. Currency of Payment
All compensation shall be computed and paid in Policy
Currency.
5. Salvage
Any amounts of salvage realized by CITI with respect to a
compensated claim shall be applied first to reimburse CITI
for its out-of-pocket expenses in pursuing salvage and shall
then be divided between the parties according to the Insured
Percentage ratio. However, to the extent CITI's net
recovery exceeds the amount CITI paid plus its out-of-pocket
expenses, the Insured shall be paid a portion of the excess
determined by dividing the time period between the date of
the loss event and the date of claim payment by the time
period between the date of the loss event and the date the
excess is recovered.
6. Maximum Liability Limits
Under no circumstances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate
under this policy for more than the amount of Maximum
Liability set forth in the Declarations. Under no circum-
stances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate under this
policy for events of loss in any one time period for more
than the amount of any Per Period Liability limit prescribed
for that period by an endorsement.
Conditions
1. Notice of Potential Claim
The Insured shall notify CITI promptly, and in no event in
more than 30 days, of any occurrence which could give rise
to a claim.
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2. Cooperation
The Insured shall take all reasonable steps to avoid or
minimize loss. Should a claim or potential claim situation
arise, such steps shall include (1) where prudent, ceasing
further performance on the Contract and refraining from new
transactions with the Buyer and (2) taking reasonable steps
to find alternative buyers for the goods or services which
are the subject of the Contract. The Insured shall
cooperate fully and cause any person or entity within its
power to cooperate fully with CITI in the investigation of
any claim, the resolution of any potential claim situation
and the pursuit of any claim salvage. Such cooperation
shall Include disclosure of records and documents and the
making available of witnesses. Prior to any claim payment,
the Insured will pursue all reasonable legal,
administrative, judicial and informal means of avoiding or
remedying any event of loss which would be compensable under
this policy. The Insured shall not enter into any agreement
concerning a loss or potential loss without CITI's prior
written consent.
3. Burden of Proof
The Insured shall have the burden of proof in establishing
its right to any compensation under this policy. Any claim
for compensation shall be submitted within three months of
the expiration of the Waiting Period following the event of
loss and if withdrawn may not be resubmitted.
4. Assignment and Subrogation
As a condition to any claim payment, the Insured shall
assign to CITI all of the Insured's right, title and
interest in the Contract, goods, equipment, materials and
currency which are the subject of the claim and all related
claims against third parties. Should CITI so request, the
Insured shall retain legal title to any interests or claims
to which CITI is entitled. Any salvage received by the
Insured shall be considered held in trust for CITI and trans-
ferred to CITI for apportionment in accordance with Article
l1l, section 5.
Warranties
The Insured warrants and agrees that:
1. Accuracy of Representations
All written statements submitted to CITI to obtain this
policy are true and correct and no material information has
been withheld. Should there be any material inaccuracy in
the Insured's representations, CITI may void this policy,
retain the premium paid and refuse to compensate the Insured
for loss occurring prior to the discovery of the material
misrepresentation.
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2. ValIdity of Contract and Authorizations
The copies of all documents submitted with the Application
are true copies of those documents; the Contract is valid
and fully enforceable In the Buyer's Country; all licenses
and authorizations obtained in connection with the Contract
are valid.
3. Preservation of Remedies
The Insured will preserve all legal, Judicial and admini-
strative remedies applicable to any claim and furnish
reasonable assistance in maintaining any rights or property
transferred to CITI.
4. Confidentiality
The Insured will not disclose the existence of this policy
to any third party without CITI's prior consent except in
confidence to the Insured's broker and banker.
5. Self-Insured Retention
The Insured will remain at risk for any loss resulting from
the perils covered to the extent not insured by this policy.
6. Modification of Contract
The Insured will not materially modify or amend the Contract
without the prior written consent of CITI.
General Provisions
1. Declarations
The Declarations and the Application are an integral part of
this policy. For purposes of this policy, the terms defined
in the Declarations shall have the meanings set forth
therein.
2. Exchange Rates
Any computation of currency equivalents required by this
policy shall utilize the method set forth in Article III,
section 1. b.
3. Cancellation
This policy may not be cancelled by either party, except
that CITI may cancel for nonpayment of Premium upon twenty
days written notice to the Insured. In such case, this
policy shall be void ab initio and no claim shall be
compensable, whether arising before or after the due date of
the Premium.
4. Non-Assignment
The Insured shall not assign or transfer this policy or the
benefits or obligations thereof to any other party or
person, except with CITI's prior consent. The Insured may,
with CITI's prior agreement, require any payments hereunder
to be made to a named loss payee, all the Insured's obliga-
tions under this policy remaining unaffected.
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5. Other Insurance
The insurance provided under this policy shall be excess
over any other Insurance or Indemnity covering the same
event of loss.
6. Notice and Modification
All notices under this policy shall be in writing and
delivered to responsible officers of the parties at the
addresses Indicated in the Declarations. This policy may be
modified only by written, mutual consent of the parties.
7. Governing Law
This policy shall be governed by the laws of New York state.
8. Arbitration
Any dispute relating to this policy shall be settled by
arbitration in New York, New York according to the then
prevailing Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Unless the Insured initiates
arbitration, CITI's liability with respect to any claim
matter shall expire one year after CITI notifies the Insured
of CITI's determination concerning an application for compen-
sation. A decision by an arbitrator or arbitral panel shall
be final and binding, subject to the Maximum Liability
limit.
Policy Number:
Form
CONTRACT FRUSTRATION INSURANCE
FOR IMPORTERS OF GOODS
between
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675("CITI")
and
(the "Insured")
DECLARATIONS
For purposes of this policy, the terms below are defined as follows:
Policy Period:
Seller:
Guarantor:
Seller's Country:
Insured's Country:
Contract:
7. Policy Currency:
8. Insured Percentage:
9. Maximum Liability:
10. Coverages Elected:
11. Waiting Period:
12. Premium:
13. Endorsements:
The Seller Is a Seller.
which has guaranteed obligations of the Seller.
subject to any Per Period Liability limits added by
endorsement.
Perils covered in Article 1.1 & 5: days
Perils covered in Article 1.2, 3, 4 & 6: days
By acceptance of this policy the Insured agrees that all statements contained
in the Application and the above Declarations and all written statements
submitted by the Insured or Its agents are the Insured's representations and
agreements and that this policy, which Includes any endorsements, constitutes
the entire agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter and
supersedes any prior agreement or understanding.
Agreed and Accepted by CITI
Title:
Date:
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CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675
CONTRACT FRUSTRATION INSURANCE
FOR IMPORTERS OF GOODS
Perils Insured
In consideration of the Premium paid by the Insured and subject
to the terms and conditions set forth below, CITI hereby agrees
to compensate the Insured for the insured Percentage of loss
occurring during the Policy Period resulting solely and directly
from any of the following perils remaining in effect continuously
for the Waiting Period:
1. Public Seller's Failure to Perform
The unjustified repudiation of the Contract or material
failure to perform by the Public Seller and any Guarantor
under the Contract, Including a failure to deliver goods,
due to any cause beyond the Insured's control and in circum-
stances where the Insured is not In material default under
the Contract, to the extent any advance payment of the
Insured is not reimbursed by the Public Seller or any
Guarantor as required by the Contract. Failure to perform
also Includes failure by the Public Seller and any Guarantor
to honor a judgment or arbitral award based upon a repudi-
ation or failure to perform under the Contract during the
Policy Period; such event of loss shall be considered to
occur during the Policy Period.
2. Seller's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation
having the force of law in the Seller's Country, including
cancellation of a valid export license, which directly
prevents further performance of the Contract and is outside
the control of the Insured.
3. Insured's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation
having the force of law in the insured's Country, including
cancellation of a valid import license, which directly
prevents further performance of the Contract and is outside
the control of the insured.
4. War
A state of war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or
revolution in the Seller's Country which directly prevents
performance of the Contract for at least six months, thereby
causing termination of the Contract.
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5. Nontransfer of Currency
Inability of the Seller and/or the Insured, after all
reasonable efforts, to transfer funds outside the Seller's
Country through any normal currency exchange channel, if
such transfer is necessary for the reimbursement of any
advance payment due the Insured in Policy Currency under the
Contract.
6. Deprivation of Insured's Goods
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation In
the Seller's Country which deprives the Insured of the right
to export from the Seller's Country goods acquired under the
Contract for which title and risk of loss have passed to the
Insured.
II. Exclusions
CITI shall not be liable for any loss caused by or arising from:
1. Nonperformance by Insured
Material failure by the Insured to perform any obligation
under the Contract or to comply with the terms of any export
or import license or other legal requirement.
2. Malfeasance by Insured
Wrongful, dishonest or criminal acts or omissions by the
Insured or its agents.
3. Insolvency or Financial Default
Insolvency, bankruptcy or financial default of any party
except a Public Seller or the official exchange control
authority of the Seller's Country.
4. Currency Fluctuation
Currency fluctuation or devaluation.
5. Disputes
Any material dispute under the Contract which has not been
finally adjudicated or settled except to the extent that the
Seller's position is demonstrably without merit or any final
award or judgment in favor the Seller is demonstrably
unjust.
6. Breach of Policy
Material breach of any representation, condition, warranty
or covenant of the Insured contained In this policy.
7. War
Declared or undeclared war (whether before or after the out-
break of hostilities) between any of China, France, Great
Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America or between the Seller's Country and
the Insured's Country.
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8. Physical Damage
Physical damage, including Ionizing radiation or contami-
nation by radioactivity from any nuclear fuel or from any
nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel or the
radioactive toxic, explosive or hazardous properties of any
nuclear assembly or nuclear component thereof.
Compensation
1. Basis of Compensation
a. Failure to Perform, Frustration, War
For loss by reason of a peril specified in sections 1, 2,
3 or 4 of Article I, compensation shall be the Insured
Percentage times the amount of advance payments reim-
bursable to the Insured under the Contract for which
goods are not delivered, less
(i) any valid credit, off-set or counter-claim
available to the Insured and(ii) any costs or expenses saved by the Insured by
reason of the Seller's non-performance under the
Contract with respect to amounts advanced by the
Insured.
b. Nontransfer of Currency
For loss by reason of the peril specified in section 5 of
Article I, compensation shall be the Insured Percentage
times the Policy Currency equivalent of the currency of
the Seller's Country sought to be transferred as of the
later of (1) the due date of the obligation or (2) the
date the currency of the Seller's Country is deposited
for transfer. The equivalent value shall be determined
by applying the net exchange rate prevailing in the
normal exchange market or channel through which Policy
Currency is generally available for the type of trans-
action involved.
c. Deprivation of Insured's Goods
For loss by reason of the peril specified in section 6 of
Article I, compensation shall be the Insured Percentage
times the price paid for the goods of which the Insured
is deprived.
2. Fines and Penalties
In no event shall compensation include any amount for govern-
mental fines, duties or taxes or Contract penalties,
including penalties for delay or nonperformance.
3. Other Compensation
With respect to any event of loss, compensation shall be
reduced by the Insured Percentage of the amount of any other
compensation or monetary benefit realized by the Insured by
reason of the event.
4. Currency of Payment
All compensation shall be computed and paid In Policy
Currency.
5. Salvage
Any amounts of salvage realized by CITI with respect to a
compensated claim shall be applied first to reimburse CITI
for Its out-of-pocket expenses In pursuing salvage and shall
then be divided between the parties according to the Insured
Percentage ratio. However, to the extent CITI's net reco-
very exceeds the amount CITI paid plus its out-of-pocket
expenses, the Insured shall be paid a portion of the excess
determined by dividing the time period between the date of
the loss event and the date of claim payment by the time
period between the date of the loss event and the date the
excess is recovered.
6. Maximum Liability Limits
Under no circumstances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate
under this policy for more than the amount of Maximum
Liability set forth in the Declarations. Under no circum-
stances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate under this
policy for events of loss in any one time period for more
than the amount of any Per-Period Liability limit prescribed
for that period by an endorsement.
IV. Conditions
1. Notice of Potential Claim
The Insured shall notify CITI promptly, and in no event in
more than 30 days, of any occurrence which could give rise
to a claim.
2. Cooperation
The Insured shall take all reasonable steps to avoid or
minimize loss. Should a claim or potential claim situation
arise, such steps shall include, where prudent, ceasing
further advances or other performance on the Contract and
refraining from new transactions with the Seller. The
Insured shall cooperate fully and cause any person or entity
within its power to cooperate fully with CITI in the investi-
gation of any claim, the resolution of any potential claim
situation and the pursuit of any claim salvage. Such
cooperation shall include disclosure of records and docu-
ments and the making available of witnesses. Prior to any
claim payment, the Insured will pursue all reasonable legal,
administrative, judicial and informal means of avoiding or
remedying any event of loss which would be compensable under
this policy. The Insured shall not enter into any agreement
concerning a loss or potential loss without CITI's prior
written consent.
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3. Burden of Proof
The insured shall have the burden of proof in establishing
its right to any compensation under this policy. Any claim
for compensation shall be submitted within three months of
the expiration of the Waiting Period following the event of
loss and if withdrawn may not be resubmitted.
4. Assignment and Subrogation
As a condition to any claim payment, the Insured shall
assign to CITI all of the Insured's right, title and inter-
est In the Contract and assets which are the subject of the
claim and all related claims against third parties. Should
CITI so request, the Insured shall retain legal title to any
interests or claims to which CITI is entitled. Any salvage
received by the Insured shall be considered held in trust
for CITI and transferred to CITI for apportionment in accor-
dance with Article 1ll, section 5.
Warranties
The insured warrants and agrees that:
1. Accuracy of Representations
All written statements submitted to CITI to obtain this
policy are true and correct and no material information has
been withheld. Should there be any material Inaccuracy in
the Insured's representations, CITI may void this policy,
retain the premium paid and refuse to compensate the Insured
for loss occurring prior to the discovery of the material
misrepresentation.
2. Validity of Contract and Authorizations
The copies of all documents submitted with the Application
are true copies of those documents; the Contract is valid
and fully enforceable in the Seller's Country; all licenses
and authorizations obtained In connection with the Contract
are valid.
3. Preservation of Remedies
The Insured will preserve all legal, judicial and admini-
strative remedies applicable to any claim and furnish
reasonable assistance in maintaining any rights or property
transferred to CITI.
4. Confidentiality
The Insured will not disclose the existence of this policy
to any third party without CITI's prior consent except in
confidence to the Insured's broker and banker.
5. Self-insured Retention
The Insured will remain at risk for any loss resulting from
the perils covered to the extent not insured by this policy.
6. Modification of Contract
The Insured will not materially modify or amend the Contract
without the prior written consent of CITI.
Vi. General Provisions
Declarations
The Declarations and the Application are an integral part of
this policy. For purposes of this policy, the terms defined
in the Declarations shall have the meanings set forth
therein.
2. Ex!hange Rates
Any computation of currency equivalents required by this
policy shall utilize the method set forth in Article Ill,
section 1.b.
3. Cancellation
This policy may not be cancelled by either party, except
that CITI may cancel for nonpayment of Premium upon twenty
days written notice to the insured. In such case, this
policy shall be void ab initio and no claim shall be compen-
sable, whether arising before or after the due date of the
Premium.
4. Non-Assignment
The Insured shall not assign or transfer this policy or the
benefits or obligations thereof to any other party or per-
son, except with CITI's prior consent. The Insured may,
with CITI's prior agreement, require any payments hereunder
to be made to a named loss payee, all the Insured's obliga-
tions under this policy remaining unaffected.
5. Other Insurance
The Insurance provided under this policy shall be excess
over any other insurance or Indemnity covering the same
event of loss.
6. Notice and Modification
All notices under this policy shall be in writing and
delivered to responsible officers of the parties at the
addresses Indicated in the Declarations. This policy may be
modified only by written, mutual consent of the parties.
7. Governing Law
This policy shall be governed by the laws of New York state.
8. Arbitration
Any dispute relating to this policy shall be settled by
arbitration in New York, New York according to the then
prevailing Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Unless the insured initiates
arbitration, CITI's liability with respect to any claim
matter shall expire one year after CITI notifies the Insured
of CITI's determination concerning an application for com-
pensation. A decision by an arbitrator or arbitral panel
shall be final and binding, subject to the Maximum Liability
limit.
Policy Number :
Form : COG 4/87
INSURANCE
FOR
CALLING OF ON-DEMAND GUARANTEE
between
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675("CITI")
and
(the "Insured")
DECLARATIONS
For purposes of this policy, the terms below are defined as follows:
1. Policy Period:
2. Buyer:
The Buyer is a Buyer.
3. Buyer's Country:
4. Insured's Country:
5. Contract:
6. Guarantee:
7. Bank:
8. Counter-Indemnity:
9. Policy Currency:
10. Insured Percentage:
11. Maximum Liability:
subject to any Per Period Liability limits
added by endorsement.
12. Waiting Period: days
13. Premium: ______________________
14. Endorsements:
By acceptance of this policy the insured agrees that all statements
contained in the Application and the above Declarations and all written
statements submitted by the Insured or Its agents are the Insured's re-
presentations and agreements and that this policy, which includes any
endorsements, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties con-
cerning the subject matter and supersedes any prior agreement or under-
standing.
Agreed and Accepted By CITI
Title:
Date:
Form COG 4/87
CITICORP INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDEMNITY, INC.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675
INSURANCE
FOR CALLING OF
ON-DEMAND GUARANTEE
Perils Insured
In consideration for the premium paid by the Insured and subject
to the terms and conditions set forth below, CITI hereby agrees
to compensate the Insured for the Insured Percentage of loss
occurring during the Policy Period resulting solely and directly
from any of the following perils remaining In effect for the
Waiting Period:
1. Public Buyer Wrongful Calling
A wrongful calling of the Guarantee by the Public Buyer to
the extent that the amount drawn is In excess of the amount
due the Public Buyer under the Contract.
2. Calling Permitted under the Contract
A calling of the Guarantee by the Buyer based upon failure
of the Insured to deliver goods or services as required by
the Agreement where such failure is solely and directly
caused by
a. Buyer's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree or regulation
having the force of law In the Buyer's Country, including
cancellation of a valid import license, which directly
prevents further performance of the Contract and is
outside the control of the Insured.
b. Insured's Country Frustration/License Cancellation
The application of any law, order, decree, or regulation
having the force of law In the Insured's Country,
including cancellation of a valid export license, which
directly prevents further performance of the Contract and
is outside the control of the Insured.
c. War
A state of war, civil war, Insurrection, rebellion or
revolution continuing in the Buyer's Country for at least
six months, which directly prevents further performance
of the Contract.
3. Failure of Public Buyer to Honor Award
A failure of the Public Buyer to honor an arbitral award orjudgment directing the Public Buyer to pay the Insured any
amount which the Public Buyer has drawn under the Guarantee.
11. Definitions
1. Contract
The contract specified in the Declarations between the
Insured and the Buyer.
2. Guarantee
The undertaking specified in the Declarations given by a
local bank to the Buyer, in accordance with the Contract.
3. Bank
The bank specified in the Declarations which the Insured has
caused to give a counter-guarantee to the local bank in re-
spect of the Guarantee.
4. Counter-Indemnity
The undertaking specified in the Declarations given by the
Insured to the Bank to indemnify the Bank for its payments
to the local bank under the Guarantee.
ill. Exclusions
CITI shall not be liable for any loss caused by or arising from:
1. Nonperformance by Insured
Material failure by the Insured to perform any obligation
under the Contract or to comply with the terms of any export
or import license or other legal requirement.
2. Malfeasance by Insured
Wrongful, dishonest or criminal acts or omissions by the
Insured or its agents.
3. Insolvency or Financial Default
insolvency, bankruptcy or financial default of any party
except a Public Buyer or the official exchange control
authority of the Buyer's Country.
4. Currency Fluctuation
Currency fluctuation or devaluation.
5. Disputes
Any material dispute under the Contract which has not been
finally adjudicated or settled except to the extent that the
Buyer's position is demonstrably without merit or any final
award or judgment in favor of the Buyer is demonstrably un-just.
6. Breach of Policy
Material breach of any representation, condition, warranty
or covenant of the Insured contained in this policy.
7. War
Declared or undeclared war (whether before or after the
outbreak of hostilities) between any of China, France, Great
Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America or between the Buyer's Country and
the Insured's Country.
8. Physical Damage
Physical damage, including Ionizing radiation or contami-
nation by radioactivity from any nuclear fuel or from any
nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel or the
radioactive toxic, explosive or hazardous properties of any
nuclear assembly or nuclear component thereof.
IV. Compensation
1. Basis of Compensation
For loss by reason of a peril specified In section 1 or 2 of
Article I, compensation shall be the Insured Percentage
times the amount which the Insured is required to pay the
Bank as a consequence of the event of loss, exclusive of any
interest payable from the calling of the Guarantee. For
loss by reason of the peril specified in section 3 of
Article I, compensation shall be the insured Percentage
times the amount of the award or judgment the Buyer has
failed to honor. Under no circumstances shall CITI be
liable In the aggregate under this policy for more than the
amount of Maximum Liability set forth in the Declarations.
2. Fines and Penalties
In no event shall compensation Include any amount for
governmental fines, duties or taxes or Contract penalties,
including penalties for delay or nonperformance.
3. Other Compensation
With respect to any event of loss, compensation shall be re-
duced by the Insured Percentage of the amount of any other
compensation or monetary benefit realized by the insured by
reason of the event.
4. Currency of Payment
All compensation shall be computed and paid in Policy
currency.
5. Salvage
Any amounts of salvage realized by CITI with respect to a
compensated claim shall be applied first to reimburse CITI
for its out-of-pocket expenses In pursuing salvage and shall
then be divided between the parties according to the Insured
Percentage ratio. However, to the extent CITI's net reco-
very exceeds the amount CITI paid plus Its out-of-pocket
expenses, the Insured shall be paid a portion of the excess
determined by dividing the time period between the date of
the payment under the Counter-Indemnity and the date of
claim payment by the time period between the date of the
payment under the Counter-indemnity and the date the excessis recovered.
6. Maximum Liability Limits
Under no circumstances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate
under this policy for more than the amount of Maximum
Liability set forth in the Declarations. Under no circum-
stances shall CITI be liable in the aggregate under this
policy for events of loss in any one time period for more
than the amount of any Per Period Liability limit prescribed
for that period by an endorsement.
V. Conditions
1. Notice of Potential Claim
The Insured shall notify CITI promptly, and in no event in
more than 30 days, of any occurrence which could give rise
to a claim.
2. Cooperation
The Insured shall take all reasonable steps to avoid or
minimize loss, Including, where prudent, ceasing furtherperformance on the contract and refraining from new
transactions with the account party. The insured shall
cooperate fully and cause any person or entity within its
power to cooperate fully with CITI in the investigation of
any claim, the resolution of any potential claim situation
and the pursuit of any claim salvage. Such cooperation
shall include disclosure of records and documents and the
making available of witnesses. Prior to any claim payment,
the Insured will pursue all reasonable legal, admini-
strative, judicial and informal means of avoiding or
remedying any event of loss which would be compensable under
this policy. The Insured shall not enter into any agreement
concerning a loss or potential loss without CITI's prior
written consent.
3. Burden of Proof
The Insured shall have the burden of proof in establishing
its right to any compensation under this policy. Any claim
for compensation shall be submitted within three months of
the expiration of the Waiting Period following the event of
loss and if withdrawn may not be resubmitted.
4. Assignment and Subrogation
As a condition to any claim payment, the insured shall
assign to CITI all of the Insured's rights against third
parties related to the loss and any other interests which
are an offset to the loss. Should CITI so request, the
Insured shall retain legal title to any interests or claims
to which CITI is entitled. Any salvage received by the
Insured shall be considered held in trust for CITI and
transferred to CITI for apportionment In accordance with
Article IV, section 5.
VI. Warranties.
The Insured warrants and agrees that:
1. Accuracy of Representations
All written statements submitted to CITI to obtain this
policy are true and correct and no material information has
been withheld. Should there be any material Inaccuracy in
the Insured's representations, CITI may void this policy,
retain the premium paid and refuse to compensate the insured
for loss occurring prior to the discovery of the material
misrepresentation.
2. Validity of Contract and Authorizations
The copies of all documents submitted with the Application
are true copies of those documents; the Contract Is valid
and fully enforceable in the Buyer's Country; all licenses
and authorizations obtained In connection with the Contract
are valid.
3. Preservation of Remedies
The Insured will preserve all legal, judicial and admini-
strative remedies applicable to any claim and furnish
reasonable assistance in maintaining any rights or property
transferred to CITI.
4. Confidentiality
The Insured will not disclose the existence of this policy
to any third party without CITI's prior consent except in
confidence to the Insured's broker and banker.
5. Self-insured Retention
The Insured will remain at risk for any loss resulting from
the perils covered to the extent not insured by this policy.
6. Modification of Contract
The Insured will not materially modify or amend the
Contract, the Guarantee or the Counter-Indemnity without the
prior written consent of CITI.
VII. General Provisions.
1. Declarations
The Declarations and the Application are an integral part of
this policy. For purposes of this policy, the terms defined
in the Declarations shall have the meanings set forth
therein.
2. Extension of Policy Period
If it appears prudent to extend the Guarantee and Counter-
Indemnity, the Insured may extend the Policy Period for up
to six months by (1) notifying CITI of the extension prior
to expiration of the original Policy Period and (2) paying
CITI, within fifteen days of commencement of the extension,
an additional r rata premium.
3. Cancellation
This policy may not be cancelled by either party, except
that CITI may cancel for nonpayment of Premium upon twenty
days written notice to the Insured. In such case, this
policy shall be void ab initio and no claim shall be compen-
sable, whether arising before or after the due date of the
Premium.
4. Non-Assignment
The insured shall not assign or transfer this policy or the
benefits or obligations thereof to any other party or
person, except with CITI's prior consent. The Insured may,
with CITI's prior agreement, require any payments hereunder
to be made to a named loss payee, all the Insured's obli-
gations under this policy remaining unaffected.
5. Other Insurance
The insurance provided under this policy shall be excess
over any other insurance or indemnity covering the same
event of loss.
6. Notice and Modification
All notices under this policy shall be in writing and de-
livered to responsible officers of the parties at the
addresses indicated in the Declarations. This policy may be
modified only by written, mutual consent of the parties.
7. Governing Law
This policy shall be governed by the laws of New York state.
8. Arbitration
Any dispute relating to this policy shall be settled by
arbitration in New York, New York according to the then
prevailing Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Unless the Insured initiates
arbitration, CITI's liability with respect to any claim
matter shall expire one year after CITI notifies the Insured
of CITI's determination concerning an application for
compensation. A decision by an arbitrator or arbitral panel
shall be final and binding, subject to the Maximum Liability
limit.
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Appendix 4
Sample Agreement Between an Insurer and Host Government
COSTA RICA
INVESTMENT GUARANTIES
Agreement signed at San Jose November 22, 1968;
Entered into force October 24, 1969
Agreement between the Governments of the United States
of America and Costa Rica relating to investment guaranties
of the Government of the United States.
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Costa Rica, desiring to strengthen the
friendly relations which unite the two countries, and
recognizing that investments in Costa Rica of private
capital originating in the United States of America can
further the development of Costa Rica's economic resources
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and productive capacity, bringing about a rise in its
production and an increase in trade between the United
States and Costa Rica, have agreed as follows:
1. The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of costa Rica shall, upon the request of
either one, consult concerning investments in Costa Rica
which the Government of the United States may guaranty.
2. The Government of the United States of America
will not guarantee an investment in Costa Rica unless the
Government of Costa Rica approves the activity to which the
investment relates.
3. If, in accordance with the Constitution and the
laws of Costa Rica, and pursuant to an investment guaranty,
an investor transfers to the Government of the United
States of America (a) legal currency of Costa Rica,
including credits in such currency; (b) any claims or
rights which the investor has or may have, resulting from
his business activities in Costa Rica or from events
entitling the investor to payments under the investment
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guaranty; or (c) all or part of the interest of an investor
in any property (real or personal, tangible or intangible)
situated in Costa Rica, the Government of Costa Rica will
recognize such transfer as valid and operative. Nothing in
the subrogation envisaged herein shall give the Government
of the United States greater rights against the assets of
the enterprise for which the investment guaranty was
granted than the rights of the subrogating investor.
4. Sums in legal currency of Cost Rica, including
credits in such currency, acquired by the Government of the
United states of America by virtue of a transfer of
currency or from sales of property, rights, or claims
transferred under an investment guaranty shall be accorded
treatment by the Government of Costa Rica with respect to
exchange, repatriation or use thereof, no less favorable
than the treatment accorded to funds of citizens of the
United States of America derived from activities comparable
to those carried out by the investor, and such sums may be
used freely by the Government of the United States of
any of its expendituresAmerica for in Cost Rica.
5. Any dispute between the Government regarding
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a. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall
give the Government of the United States of America other
rights than those held by the investor with respect to any
petitions, claims, or rights to which the Government of the
United States has been subrogated.
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title, dominion, or possession, tenancy, or occupancy of
such lands, or in any way to acquire title of ownership to
any part of such national territory.
c. Pursuant to its Constitution, its laws, and the
Agreement, the Government of Costa Rica will permit
investors to make the necessary arrangements to dispose of
properties still belonging to them after receiving
compensation from the Government of the United States,
transferring them in the most expeditious form, consistent
with obtaining their fair value pursuant to the provisions
of the laws of Costa Rica, to persons qualified to acquire
them in accordance with such laws.
7. This agreement shall enter into force on the date
of the note whereby the Government of Costa Rica informs
the Government of the United States of America that it has
been approved in conformity with the constitutional
procedures of Costa Rica.' When this Agreement enters
into force, it shall replace and terminate the Agreement on
' 9 October, 24, 1969
investment guaranties
dated February 23 and
February 26, 1955,"*
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Done in duplicate, in the English and Spanish
languages, both
day of November,
equally authentic,
1968.
on this twenty second
(SIGNED) For the Government of the United States of
America. Clarence A. Boonstra, Ambassador.
(SIGNED) For the Government of the Republic of Costa
Rica, Fernando Lara, Minister of Foreign Relations.
50 TIAS 3201; 6 UST 665
but
in
duly
Jose,
